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Reconnecting free movement of workers and equal treatment in an unequal Europe  
 
Niamh Nic Shuibhne  
  
Abstract 
This article argues that free movement rights for workers should be more consciously reconnected to 
the prohibition on nationality discrimination in EU law. It questions whether the principal aim of 
achieving the greatest possible freedom of movement detracts from the fundamental objective of 
equal treatment, using proposals agreed in February 2016 as part of the renegotiation of the UK’s 
membership of the EU to demonstrate the risks of privileging movement in a more abstract sense over 
how workers who do move are actually treated. One implication of emphasising equal treatment is 
that disconnecting national criteria from the definition of work/worker is more difficult to defend. 
However, in the absence of harmonised definitions of these concepts in EU legislation, engaging the 
shared responsibility of the Member States can be rationalised within the wider system of free 
movement law and would also enable deeper reflection on whether the current framework is 
adequately attuned to the rapidly changing reality of work. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The extent to which equal treatment protects EU citizens who are neither working nor self-employed, 
within the meaning of EU law, was intensely discussed after recent judgments of the Court of Justice.1 
Stronger legal protection for EU workers derives in part from differences between arts 21 and 45 TFEU 
on the limitation of rights,2 as well as from distinct legislative provision both within Directive 2004/38 
on the free movement of EU citizens generally and from the retention in force of worker-specific 
legislation notwithstanding the Directive’s aim of ‘remedying th[e] sector-by-sector, piecemeal 
approach to the right of free movement and residence’.3 One critical difference concerns the right to 
reside in another State for more than three months. EU citizens who work or are self-employed enjoy 
                                                          
 School of Law, University of Edinburgh. This work was funded by a Leverhulme Trust Major Research 
Fellowship. I am grateful to the participants in seminars at the Universities of Stockholm and Utrecht and at 
the European University Institute; to Marise Cremona, David Edward, Panos Koutrakos, Herwig Verschueren 
and the anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments on the written paper; and to the Centre for European 
Law at the University of Oslo. 
1 Brey (C-140/12) EU:C:2013:565, Dano (C-333/13) EU:C:2014:2358, Alimanovic (C-67/14) EU:C:2015: 597, 
García-Nieto (C-299/14) EU:C:2016:114, and Commission v UK (C-308/14) EU:C:2016:43. 
2 Article 21(1) TFEU provides that ‘[e]very citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties 
and by the measures adopted to give them effect’ but art. 45(3) TFEU makes freedom of movement for 
workers subject only to ‘limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health’.  
3 Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States, OJ 2004 L158/77, recital 4. On workers specifically, see 
Regulation 492/2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union, OJ 2011 L141/1. See also, 
Regulation 883/2004/EC on the coordination of social security systems, OJ 2004 L166/1. 
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this right without any further conditions (art. 7(1)(a) of Directive 2004/38) but others must 
demonstrate that they ‘have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to 
become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State during their period of 
residence and have comprehensive sickness insurance cover’ (art. 7(1)(b)).  
 However, the apparently secure legal position of EU workers should not be taken for granted.4 
A particularly sharp jolt came from the conclusions of the European Council meeting in February 2016, 
as part of which a Decision of the Heads of State or Government outlined an agreed mandate for 
legislative reform that would have introduced discrimination against EU workers.5 The spectre of 
Brexit could be argued to call for and to justify a response of pragmatic flexibility, to warrant a 
loosening of the legal and perhaps also ideological rigidity often attributed to the conservation of free 
movement rights. The problem with that argument is that it concentrates too narrowly on one 
dimension of the proposed reforms: the restriction of free movement per se. But the 2016 Decision 
mounted a double attack on EU legal fundamentals. It challenged not just freedom of movement but 
also the principle that workers who are nationals of other Member States must be treated equally 
with host State workers. Respect for equality is one of the values on which the Union is ‘founded’ (art. 
2 TEU). Legislating for differential treatment is therefore a different order of attack.  
  This article argues that free movement rights have become damagingly detached from 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality. What should the principal aim of art. 45 TFEU be: 
promoting free movement to the greatest extent possible, or focusing more on how people who do 
move are actually treated? The objective is not to ‘return the principle of free movement to its 
economic foundation – workers, factors of production in a common market – and away from its new 
citizenship grounding’.6 Rather, the analysis concentrates on workers to expose the vulnerability of 
even free movement law’s presumed safe core and the neglect of equal treatment in consequence of 
EU law’s constant compulsion to propel itself beyond discrimination. The procedural argument is that 
how we reform free movement law requires careful negotiation of political objectives and legal 
constraints. Reform of free movement law is not impossible, but reform processes must be legally 
defensible and robust. Reform options that more strongly engage the shared obligations of the 
Member States are also discussed.7  
                                                          
4 E.g. AG Wathelet in Bragança Linares Verruga and Others (C-238/15) EU:C:2016:389 at [3]-[5] of the Opinion: 
‘In a world in which the dominant economic model is proving to have its limits, budgetary constraint has 
become a daily reality. Since the beginning of the “European project”, freedom of movement has been one of 
the fundamental freedoms.…That freedom…is today being called in question and put under pressure’. 
5 Section D, Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European Council, concerning a 
new settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union, 2016 OJ C691/1. 
6 JHH Weiler ‘The case for a kinder, gentler Brexit’ (2017) 15 I•CON 1, 2. 
7 On the responsibilities of the EU more particularly, see C O’Brien, ‘Civis capitalist sum: class as the new 
guiding principle of EU free movement rights’ (2016) 53 CML Rev 937. 
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 Two proposals for reform in the 2016 Decision – restricting ‘in-work’ benefits for ‘newly 
arriving EU workers’ and indexation of exported family benefits – are first assessed as prototypes for 
legislative change. This legally binding (Article 3(iii)) Decision established a commitment to amend EU 
legislation but did not take effect in light of the outcome of the UK referendum in June 2016 (art. 
3(iv)). Nevertheless, notwithstanding the characteristic dismissal of its content in the referendum 
debate, it is argued here that the proposals agreed would have overturned decades of EU free 
movement law fundamentals had they been enacted and that this point needs to be made. The 
Decision communicated with some confidence that its content was ‘fully compatible with the Treaties’ 
(art. 3(ii)). But neither proposal easily survives against established legal principles, even 
acknowledging the extent to which the applicable framework has blurred the significance of the type 
of discrimination at issue and expanded the latitude of justification on public interest grounds. This 
section also examines the legitimacy of imposing on workers a requirement to demonstrate, beyond 
the fact of work, other forms of connection with the host State labour market and/or with host State 
society. It is not denied that recent case law exhibits mixed messages. But it is argued that the 
reasoning offered in the 2016 Decision failed to disaggregate material legal distinctions or to take 
account of the complex inter-connectedness of different legislative measures relevant to the free 
movement of workers. Ironically, the influence of EU citizenship law poses a risk to the legal security 
of workers in these respects.8  
Free movement is a shared competence, yet the Member States are too often portrayed as 
passive or even destructive actors (without much complaint on their part) – as valiant defenders of 
national priorities against ever more excessive obligations inflicted by the demands of free movement. 
It is time that Member States instead demonstrated leadership as active and constructive architects 
of the legal framework. Before offering insights into how that might be realised, formative case law 
on the free movement of workers is first outlined to show that a critical choice was made about the 
interpretation of arts 45-48 TFEU at the very beginning. By assigning achievement of the greatest 
possible freedom of movement as the principal aim of these provisions, the Court instituted a legal 
framework never conceived around equal treatment with host State workers. The resultant 
understanding of restrictions as obstacles impacting upon that freedom reflects how free movement 
rights are deployed to induce the internal market more generally. But we tend not to frame the 
consequences of this for what they are: instances of special treatment vis-à-vis host State nationals. 
The Court’s resolve to fortify the definition of worker as an autonomous concept of EU law is then 
introduced as another important feature of the founding legal framework. A framework more 
                                                          
8 See further, S Reynolds ‘(De)constructing the road to Brexit: paving the way to further limitations on free 
movement and equal treatment?’ in D Thym (ed.) Questioning EU Citizenship: Judges and the Limits of Free 
Movement and Solidarity in the EU (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017) 57. 
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consciously grounded in equal treatment with host State workers requires us to question whether the 
Court’s definition should continue to remain formally disconnected from national criteria.  
Free movement is an idea, and achievement, of extraordinary vision and ambition. The 
arguments developed here do not seek to undermine its value and they do not seek to question 
existing rules in response to ‘problems’ with free movement law that are simply not demonstrated by 
evidence, as will also be explained in the analysis below. Rather, it is suggested that aiming for the 
‘greatest possible freedom’ has different material consequences as a legal benchmark than as a 
political objective. Alongside this, EU legal premises on the free movement of workers have barely 
changed notwithstanding transformative change in the practice of work itself. Is the legal framework 
properly reflective of the problems that cross-border workers actually face now? In that light, how 
free movement rules might be reformed has much wider significance than the specifics of Brexit. The 
central question is this: what do we want free movement, ultimately, to be about: as much of it as 
possible, however flawed its exercise in practice; or how we treat the people who move? 
 
Reforming free movement of workers: the February 2016 Decision 
 
This section examines the proposals for phased-in entitlement to in-work benefits and indexation of 
exported family benefits and calls into question the legal analysis offered in the Decision. As noted in 
the Introduction, the Decision never took legal effect. However, its radical overturning of equal 
treatment fundamentals serves as a cautionary tale for ongoing calls for and processes of reform, 
returned to in more detail below. 
The text framing the 2016 proposals concentrates on challenges caused by asymmetric free 
movement. Having first affirmed that the free movement of workers is ‘an integral part of the internal 
market’ – expressed (upgraded?) meanwhile as an ‘indivisible’ part9 – Section D of the Decision 
suggested:  
 
Different levels of remuneration among the Member States make some offers of employment 
more attractive than others, with consequential movements that are a direct result of the 
freedom of the market. However, the social security systems of the Member States, which 
Union law coordinates but does not harmonise, are diversely structured and this may in itself 
attract workers to certain Member States. It is legitimate to take this situation into account 
and to provide, both at Union and at national level, and without creating unjustified direct or 
indirect discrimination, for measures limiting flows of workers of such a scale that they have 
negative effects both for the Member States of origin and for the Member States of 
destination.  
 
                                                          
9 European Council (Art. 50) guidelines following the United Kingdom's notification under Article 50 TEU, 29 
April 2017, para. 1 (‘core principles’). 
 5 
Identifying social security advantages as a free movement pull factor is symptomatic of the 
atmosphere in which the reforms were devised even though empirical evidence does not support the 
claim, a point returned to below. As emphasised at the outset, the argument here is not that reform 
is impossible, but that reform processes must be legally defensible and robust. The discussion first 
outlines, at a general level, the capacity of the EU legislator to condition the free movement of 
workers. The proposals on in-work benefits (raising questions about degrees of connection to the host 
State labour market) and exported family benefits (raising, additionally, degrees of connection to host 
State society) are then assessed, highlighting problematic implications for equal treatment in 
particular. The final part of this section interrogates the Decision’s statements on justification and 
proportionality.  
 
Reforming free movement of workers by legislation: general principles 
 
Article 46 TFEU authorises the adoption of directives and regulations ‘to bring about freedom of 
movement for workers, as defined in Article 45’ and offers a non-exhaustive (‘in particular’) list of 
issues to address. Article 48 TFEU provides specifically for competence to ‘adopt such measures in the 
field of social security as are necessary to provide freedom of movement for workers’. The boundaries 
of legislative autonomy have emerged to date10 through case law. The Treaty ‘does not prohibit the 
[Union] legislature from attaching conditions to the rights and advantages which it accords in order to 
ensure freedom of movement for workers or from determining the limits thereto’.11 However, while it 
has ‘wide discretion’,12 the legislature must exercise its powers ‘in conformity with the provisions of 
the Treaty’ – a limitation that has produced successful legality challenges to attempted amendments 
of social security legislation.13 For present purposes, it is significant that infringement of equal 
treatment – whether by direct or indirect nationality discrimination – has been a consistent red line 
for the Court. In Coonan, it determined that the principal aim of Regulation 1612/68 was ‘to ensure 
that in each Member State workers from the other Member States receive treatment which is not 
discriminatory by comparison with that of national workers by providing for the systematic application 
of the rule of national treatment as far as all conditions of employment and work are concerned’.14  
                                                          
10 Though note the mechanism for potential Council/European Council override of draft legislation in art. 48 
TFEU, added by the Lisbon Treaty. 
11 Gray (C-62/91) EU:C: 1992:177 at [11] (emphasis added). 
12 Von Chamier-Glisczinski (C-208/07) EU:C:2009:455 at [40]. 
13 E.g. for Reg 1408/71, Petroni (24/75) EU:C:1971:129 at [20]. 
14 Coonan (110/79) EU:C:1980:112 at [6] (emphasis added). Broader questions about the principal aim of arts 
45-48 TFEU are returned to in the next section below. 
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For directly discriminatory restrictions, only derogations specified in Article 45(3) TFEU should 
apply.15 It is true that the Court has not always adhered rigidly to this position but, for free movement 
of workers, the main incursion to date concerns arguments raised not by the EU legislature (or by 
Member States) but by private actors.16 The narrowness of the public policy derogation is another 
established premise of the case law.17 For indirectly discriminatory restrictions and non-discriminatory 
obstacles, the objective justification defence applies. But public interest arguments accepted in 
principle must also be proportionate, which normally means demonstration of the appropriateness 
and necessity of the measure under review. However, elements of the legal framework on justification 
and proportionality have mutated in recent years and will be returned to below. 
 
Requiring a link to the host State labour market: restricting in-work benefits 
 
Section D of the 2016 Decision stated that ‘Member States have the right to define the fundamental 
principles of their social security systems and enjoy a broad margin of discretion to define and 
implement their social and employment policy, including setting the conditions for access to welfare 
benefits’ (para. 1(a)). Case law has always recognised this,18 and the conflict rules of Regulation 
883/2004 are built around it. Neither can Regulation 492/2011 ‘be regarded as a harmonising 
measure. [It] does not seek to approximate the legislation of the Member States but gives effect to 
Article [45 TFEU] in particular by way of certain provisions intended to abolish any discrimination on 
the ground of nationality as between workers of the Member States’.19 However: 
 
The [Union] legislature has acted on the assumption that an economic migrant will not claim 
any subsistence allowance in the host Member State. Article 7 of Regulation [492/2011] grants 
the migrant worker rights primarily in respect of conditions of employment and, moreover, 
social advantages that facilitate his stay...Meanwhile, however, this assumption by the 
                                                          
15 Ugliola (15/69) at [3] and [6]; confirmed in e.g. Masgio (C-10/90) EU:C:1991:107 at [24]. 
16 See esp. Bosman (C-415/93) EU:C:1995:463 at [121]ff.  
17 E.g. Clean Car Autoservice (C-350/96) EU:C:1998:205 at [40]: ‘recourse to the concept of public policy as 
used in [art. 45 TFEU] presupposes…the existence…of a genuine and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of 
the fundamental interests of society’ (citing Bouchereau (30/77) EU:C:1977:172). Linking the narrowness of 
public policy to the creation of objective justification in the first place, see D Thym ‘The constitutional 
dimension of public policy justifications’ in P Koutrakos, N Nic Shuibhne and P Syrpis (eds.) Exceptions from EU 
Free Movement Law: Derogation, Justification and Proportionality (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016) 166, 168-
169. Advocating a broader approach in the context of in-work benefits, see G Davies ‘Brexit and the free 
movement of workers: a plea for national legal assertiveness’ (2016) 41 ELRev 925, 928-930. 
18 E.g. Pinna I (41/84) EU:C:1986:1 at [20]: ‘Article [48 TFEU] provides for the coordination, not the 
harmonization, of the legislation of the Member States. As a result, Article [48] leaves in being differences 
between the Member States’ social security systems and, consequently, in the rights of persons working in the 
Member States. It follows that substantive and procedural differences between the social security systems of 
individual Member States, and hence in the rights of persons working in the Member States, are unaffected by 
Article [48]. 
19 AG Geelhoed in Akrich (C-109/01) EU:C:2003:112 at [166] of the Opinion.  
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[Union] legislature that the economic migrant will be able to provide entirely for himself has 
been called somewhat into question.20 
 
That evolution was precisely the object of the 2016 Decision. In para. 2(b) of Section D, the text refers 
to the ‘pull factor arising from a Member State’s in-work benefits regime’ – a phrase that appears 
nowhere else in EU legislation to date – and proposes:  
 
an alert and safeguard mechanism that responds to situations of inflow of workers from other 
Member States of an exceptional magnitude over an extended period of time, including as a 
result of past policies following previous EU enlargements. A Member State wishing to avail 
itself of the mechanism would notify the Commission and the Council that such an exceptional 
situation exists on a scale that affects essential aspects of its social security system, including 
the primary purpose of its in-work benefits system, or which leads to difficulties which are 
serious and liable to persist in its employment market or are putting an excessive pressure on 
the proper functioning of its public services.  
 
Following a Commission proposal, the Council could authorise a State ‘to restrict access to non-
contributory in-work benefits to the extent necessary’. That State could then ‘limit the access of newly 
arriving EU workers to non-contributory in-work benefits for a total period of up to four years from 
the commencement of employment’. The resulting ‘limitation should be graduated, from an initial 
complete exclusion but gradually increasing access to such benefits to take account of the growing 
connection of the worker with the labour market of the host Member State’. The authorisation would 
have ‘limited duration and apply to EU workers newly arriving during a period of 7 years’.  
 A first observation concerns the extremity of circumstances conveyed by the language used: 
not just an inflow of workers, but one of ‘exceptional magnitude’; not just difficulties in a State’s 
employment market but ‘difficulties which are serious and liable to persist’; not just pressure on the 
proper functioning of public services but ‘excessive pressure’. Second, neither an alert and safeguard 
mechanism nor the proviso of limited duration is new to EU law. Article 226 EEC – a transitional 
provision in the Treaty of Rome – provided: 
 
If, during the transitional period, difficulties arise which are serious and liable to persist in any 
sector of the economy or which could bring about serious deterioration in the economic 
situation of a given area, a Member State may apply for authorisation to take protective 
measures in order to rectify the situation and adjust the sector concerned to the economy of 
the common market.  
On application by the State concerned, the Commission shall, by emergency procedure, 
determine without delay the protective measures which it considers necessary, specifying the 
circumstances and the manner in which they are to be put into effect.  
The measures authorised under paragraph 2 may involve derogations from the rules of this 
Treaty, to such an extent and for such periods as are strictly necessary in order to attain the 
                                                          
20 Ibid paras 18-19 of the Opinion. 
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objectives referred to in paragraph 1. Priority shall be given to such measures as will least 
disturb the functioning of the common market.21 
 
Reference to art. 226 EEC was entirely absent from the 2016 Decision. Considering the provision in 
1963, AG Lagrange emphasised its explicitly transitional nature.22 In that sense, art. 226 was intended 
to progress acceptance of common market obligations towards a more integrated and more stable 
phase. Does the replication of its essence in 2016 suggest a new phase of transition, but towards 
acceptance instead of a more diverse and more variable market? If it does, what role then for equal 
treatment? Even in 1963, however, the Court interrogated the evidence base of the claims 
presented.23 That dimension of the 2016 Decision is deeply problematic and is returned to below. 
First, the equal treatment and labour market link aspects of restricting in-work benefits are examined.  
 
Work, social advantages, and equal treatment 
 
The Court has ruled that ‘the concept of worker has a specific [Union] meaning and may not be defined 
on the basis of criteria laid down in national legislation. Member States cannot therefore unilaterally 
make the grant of the social advantages contemplated in Article 7(2) of [Regulation 492/2011] 
conditional upon the completion of a given period of occupational activity’.24 But even if States cannot 
condition social advantages ‘unilaterally’, does that mean that it cannot be done collectively i.e. 
through EU legislation? More specifically, what is a non-contributory in-work benefit – social 
assistance, a social advantage, or an amalgam of these categories? And does it matter? 
In Brey, concerning EU citizens who were not working or self-employed, the Court defined 
‘social assistance’ under Directive 2004/38 as ‘all assistance introduced by the public authorities…that 
can be claimed by an individual who does not have resources sufficient to meet his own basic needs 
and the needs of his family and who, by reason of that fact, may become a burden on the public 
finances of the host Member State during his period of residence’.25 It drew from Skalka – a case on 
Regulation 1408/71 – where it had similarly emphasised that a social assistance benefit is ‘intended 
to guarantee a minimum subsistence income’.26  
                                                          
21 Note also the safeguard mechanism linked to serious imbalances in the workforce provided for in Regulation 
38/64/CEE relatif à la libre circulation des travailleurs à l'intérieur de la Communauté [1964] OJ 62/965 
(repealed by Regulation 1612/68), similarly concerning e.g. grave danger (art. 2). 
22 In contrast to the more permanent procedure in art. 37 ECSC; AG Lagrange in Italian Government v 
Commission (13/63) EU:C:1963:9, p182. 
23 Italian Government v Commission (13/63) EU:C:1963:20, p178. 
24 Lair (39/86) EU:C:1988:322 at [41]-[42] (emphasis added).  
25 Brey (C-140/12) EU:C:2013:565 at [61]. 
26 Skalka (C-160/02) EU:C:2004:269 at [24]. 
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Frilli provided early consideration of a guaranteed income benefit in the context of work. The 
Italian Government submission merged a bold understanding of social advantages with 
straightforward application of equal treatment: ‘[s]ince the guaranteed income applies in the field of 
employment— even if it has wider objectives and purposes— and since the employment sector is 
amongst those which have been governed by rules of [Union] law, any restriction on the grant of the 
guaranteed income by reason of the nationality of the claimants is contrary to [art. 18 TFEU]’.27 
Interestingly, the Commission was more cautious. It noted that the Treaty ‘has laid down a different 
legal basis for the general rules for the progressive attainment of freedom of movement for workers 
on the one hand (Article [46 TFEU]) and, on the other, the field of social security (Article [48 TFEU]). 
Therefore it appears at first sight difficult to acknowledge that social security might be included among 
the social advantages mentioned in Article 7(2) of [the] Regulation…adopted in application of Article 
[46]’.28 However, it acknowledged that equal treatment must apply if the guaranteed income benefit 
was found to constitute a ‘social advantage’. 
The Court resolved the case on the basis of Regulation No 3, noting the ‘double function’ of 
the national legislation: ‘it consists on the one hand in guaranteeing a subsistence level to persons 
wholly outside the social security system, and on the other hand in providing an income supplement 
for persons in receipt of inadequate social security benefits’.29 Its classically broad definition of ‘social 
advantages’ came soon afterwards in Cristini, detaching social and tax advantages from contracts of 
employment, and justifying this ‘in view of the equality of treatment which [art. 7(2) of the Regulation] 
seeks to achieve’.30 Bringing the two lines of case law together, it ruled in Hoeckx that ‘a benefit 
guaranteeing a minimum means of subsistence constitutes a social advantage, within the meaning of 
Regulation [492/2011], which may not be denied to a migrant worker who is a national of another 
Member State and is resident within the territory of the State paying the benefit, nor to his family’.31 
In Matteucci, it characterised art. 7(2) as ‘a general rule which imposes responsibility in the social 
sphere on each Member State with regard to every worker who is a national of another Member 
State…as far as equality of treatment with national workers is concerned’.32 Finally, reversing the 
position taken in earlier case law, the Court ruled that art. 7(2) of Regulation 492/2011 can apply even 
                                                          
27 Frilli (1/72) EU:C:1972:56, p462. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Frilli (1/72) EU:C:1972:56 at [15]; it also referred to ‘the rule of equality of treatment which is one of the 
fundamental principles of [Union] law’ (at [19]). 
30 Cristini (32/75) EU:C:1975:120 at [13]; see further e.g. Reina (65/81) EU:C:1982:6 at [12]. 
31 Hoeckx (249/83) EU:C:1985:139 at [22]; confirmed in e.g. Scrivner (122/84) EU:C:1985:145. In Kempf 
(139/85) EU:C:1986:223, the Court ruled that receiving income from public funds did not negate worker status, 
discussed further below. 
32 Matteucci (235/87) EU:C:1988:460 at [16] (emphasis added). 
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if the benefit in question falls also within the scope of Regulation 883/200433 – a finding with particular 
implications for indexation of benefits and returned to again below. 
Case law therefore exhibits a deep-rooted bond between work, equal treatment and access 
to social advantages. Amending Regulation 492/2011 to institute phased-in access, even in extreme 
circumstances, would have been a direct strike at this framework. There is a brief reference to equal 
treatment in Section D of the 2016 Decision, but only to require that ‘[t]he future measures referred 
to…should not result in EU workers enjoying less favourable treatment than third country nationals in 
a comparable situation’ (para. 2) – an astonishing statement in light of the case law outlined above. 
To date, only the claims of jobseekers have been severed from the scope of art. 7(2).34 In Dano, a 
restrictive judgment on citizenship rights in general terms, the Court affirmed that ‘[u]nder Article 
7(1)(a) of Directive 2004/38…Union citizens [who are working] in the host Member State have the 
right of residence without having to fulfil any other condition’.35 Because workers in consequence 
reside lawfully in a host State, they may then (continue to) claim equal treatment rights under art. 
24(1) – considered by the Court to be a ‘specific expression’ of art. 18 TFEU.36  
The distinction confirmed in Dano also raises another problem: failure to have regard to the 
intersection of legislative measures. The 2016 Decision proposes only an amendment of Regulation 
492/2011, but its effects would surely have to be reflected in arts 7(1) and 24 of the Directive too. 
Relatedly, the Decision made no reference to the fact that the concept of social advantages applies 
also in the context of self-employment,37 providing another reminder that amendments to EU 
legislation should comply with rights that flow directly from the Treaty.  
However, arguably the biggest problem is the Decision’s presentation of the proposal as direct 
discrimination – restrictions that apply only to ‘newly arriving EU workers’ – because then only art. 
45(3) TFEU derogation grounds could be used to defend it. In other words, the proposed amendment 
‘confronts only workers who have exercised their right to freedom of movement’.38 Perhaps if the UK 
had decided to remain in the EU, the Commission might have recast the amendment as indirect 
discrimination through the setting of a residence rather than ‘newly arriving’ condition. In that 
situation, the justification threshold would alter from virtually impenetrable to still significantly 
                                                          
33 Commission v Luxembourg (C-111/91) EU:C:1993:92 at [21].   
34 Lebon (316/85) EU:C:1987:302 at [26]; confirmed in Collins (C-138/02) EU:C:2004:172 at [31]. 
35 Dano (C-333/13) EU:C:2014:2358 at [75] (emphasis added). The requirement that persons not working must 
have sufficient resources demonstrates, according to the Court, that ‘Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38 seeks 
to prevent economically inactive Union citizens from using the host Member State’s welfare system to fund 
their means of subsistence’ (para. 76) – suggesting that the Directive does not preclude workers from doing so. 
36 Dano (C-333/13) EU:C:2014:2358 at [61]. 
37 Regulation 492/2011 does not apply to self-employment, but the Court draws equal treatment rights 
directly from art. 49 TFEU; on equal treatment, guaranteed minimum income benefits and freedom of 
establishment, see Commission v Luxembourg (C-299/01) EU:C:2002:394, esp. [12]. 
38 Vougioukas (C-443/93) EU:C:1995:394 at [41]. 
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difficult, as explained further in the discussion on justification and proportionality below. However, 
the language of the Decision itself was unambiguously directly discriminatory. The alert and safeguard 
mechanism may not therefore have been a radical limitation of free movement. But it did represent 
a radical reconfiguration of how EU workers are treated: differential eligibility for social advantages 
as they undertake the same work as and alongside national workers yet remain under the same 
taxation obligations. It is about time that this particular spade was so called. 
 
Work and links to the host State labour market 
 
Paragraph 1(a) of Section D states that ‘conditions may be imposed in relation to certain benefits to 
ensure that there is a real and effective degree of connection between the person concerned and the 
labour market of the host Member State’. In case law involving economic activity, this requirement 
has only ever been imposed on jobseekers.39 There is more developed case law on conditionality in 
other sectors of the free movement of persons: for example, on student maintenance before the 
adoption of Directive 2004/38.40 But those judgments concern integration into host State society and 
not, more specifically, the host State labour market. The translation of that broader objective to 
workers in the form of residence conditions has already been ruled out.41  
More specifically, the fact of participating in the host State labour market ‘establishes, in 
principle, a sufficient link of integration with the society of that Member State, allowing [workers] to 
benefit from the principle of equal treatment, as compared with national workers, as regards social 
advantages’.42 The Court has reasoned that ‘[t]he link of integration arises from, inter alia, the fact 
that, through the taxes which he pays in the host Member State by virtue of his employment, the 
migrant worker also contributes to the financing of the social policies of that State and should profit 
from them under the same conditions as national workers’.43 It referred in support to the third recital 
of Regulation 1612/68,44 further enhanced as the fourth recital of Regulation 492/2011.45 The 2016 
Decision therefore faced directly opposing case law: to which it made no reference. Its pick and mix 
approach to legal justification fails to unpick different strands of reasoning based on different Treaty 
                                                          
39 Collins (C-138/02) EU:C:2004:172 at [69]-[70]; Vatsouras and Koupatantze (C‑ 22/08 and C‑ 23/08) 
EU:C:2009:344 at [37]-[38]; Prete (C-367/11) EU:C:2012:668 at [44]-[47].  
40 See esp. Bidar (C-209/03) EU:C:2005:169. 
41 Commission v Netherlands (C-542/09) EU:C:2012:346 at [63]. 
42 Commission v Netherlands (C-542/09) EU:C:2012:346 at [65]. 
43 Commission v Netherlands (C-542/09) EU:C:2012:346 at [66]. 
44 Commission v Netherlands (C-542/09) EU:C:2012:346 at [67]. 
45 ‘Freedom of movement constitutes a fundamental right of workers and their families. Mobility of labour 
within the Union must be one of the means by which workers are guaranteed the possibility of improving their 
living and working conditions and promoting their social advancement, while helping to satisfy the 
requirements of the economies of the Member States. ...’ 
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provisions. This criticism is not about the extent to which judgments of the Court lock down an 
interpretation that becomes resilient to legislative revision, though that is in itself a significant 
question upon which to reflect.46 It is, for present purposes, more about how things fit together as 
part of a wider system. Opposing legal premises should not be ignored and proposals for reform 
should be rigorously rationalised in that light. 
More generally, requiring links to the host State labour market is just a peculiar way to 
condition the free movement of workers, which is defined by exactly that link. Requiring connections 
of particular duration with no corresponding alteration in, for example, tax obligations illustrates 
further the degree of the inequality of treatment contemplated. It is true, though, that for links to 
host State society, the language in Commission v Netherlands is qualified – integration requirements 
are satisfied in principle through work. Could that proviso therefore rationalise the other proposal 
examined here i.e. indexation of exported family benefits?  
 
Requiring a link to host State society: indexation of exported family benefits 
 
The 2016 Decision proposed an amendment to Regulation 883/2004 ‘to give Member States, with 
regard to the exportation of child benefits to a Member State other than that where the worker 
resides, an option to index such benefits to the conditions of the Member State where the child 
resides’ (Section D, para. 2(a)). This option was to apply ‘only to new claims made by EU workers’ but 
with the possibility that ‘from 1 January 2020, all Member States may extend indexation to existing 
claims to child benefits already exported by EU workers’.47 In a Declaration attached to the Decision, 
the Commission noted that the ‘conditions of the Member State where the child resides’ would 
include ‘the standard of living and the level of child benefits applicable in that Member State’ (Annex 
5). To evaluate the legality of the amendment, this sub-section outlines the legal principles applicable 
to Regulation 883/2004 and child benefits and discusses that measure’s relationship to other 
legislation. It then questions the transposition to exportability of child benefits of case law permitting 
conditionality through links to host State society. 
 
Regulation 883/2004, child benefits and equal treatment 
 
                                                          
46 PAJ Syrpis ‘The relationship between primary and secondary law in the EU’ (2015) 52 CML Rev 461; G Davies 
‘The European Union legislature as an agent of the European Court of Justice’ (2016) 54 JCMS 846. 
47 Indexation of other types of exportable benefits (e.g. pensions) was ruled out, at least on the part of the 
Commission. For comprehensive discussion of the underlying legal framework, see G Strban ‘Family benefits in 
the EU: is it still possible to coordinate them?’ (2016) 23 MJ 775. 
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By setting up a system of conflict rules rather than ‘a common system of social security’,48 Regulation 
883/2004 aims to navigate legitimately different national systems, in order to identify the State of 
responsibility for payment and to facilitate aggregation of entitlement across two or more systems 
while avoiding undue overlap of benefits. An important consequence of choosing a system of 
coordination is that ‘the Treaty offers no guarantee to a worker that extending his activities into more 
than one Member State or transferring them to another Member State will be neutral as regards social 
security’; that ‘may be to the worker's advantage in terms of social security or not, according to 
circumstance’.49 Article 7 of Regulation 883/2004 states: ‘[u]nless otherwise provided for by this 
Regulation, cash benefits payable under the legislation of one or more Member States or under this 
Regulation shall not be subject to any reduction, amendment, suspension, withdrawal or confiscation 
on account of the fact that the beneficiary or the members of his family reside in a Member State other 
than that in which the institution responsible for providing benefits is situated’. Would amending this 
provision suffice to enable indexation of exported child benefits?  
The Court has repeatedly stated that ‘regulations in the field of social security have as their 
basis, their framework and their bounds Articles [45-48 TFEU] which are aimed at securing freedom of 
movement for workers’.50 Thus while art. 4 provides that ‘persons to whom [the] Regulation applies 
shall enjoy the same benefits and be subject to the same obligations under the legislation of any 
Member State as the nationals thereof’ only ‘unless otherwise provided for by this Regulation’, 
amending that measure to introduce indexation is not straightforward when the wider system of EU 
law is taken into account. As we saw also for in-work benefits, the strongest objection to indexation 
is an equal treatment argument. In particular, the indexation proposal was again framed as direct 
discrimination (‘new claims made by EU workers’) and that choice has implications for how the 
measure might be justified. If the restrictions were rephrased around residence conditions applying 
also to workers of host State nationality, they would still constitute indirect discrimination since EU 
workers are more likely than host State workers to have family members in other States.51 The 2016 
Decision therefore sought to amend legislative rules that reflect established case law.  
Regulation 883/2004 defines ‘family benefits’ in art. 1(z) as ‘all benefits in kind or in cash 
intended to meet family expenses, excluding advances of maintenance payments and special 
childbirth and adoption allowances’. Article 67 provides that ‘[a] person shall be entitled to family 
benefits in accordance with the legislation of the competent Member State, including for his family 
members residing in another Member State, as if they were residing in the former Member State’ while 
                                                          
48 De Moor (2/67) EU:C:1967:28, p207. 
49 Hervein and Hervillie (C-393/99 and C-394/99) EU:C:2002:182 at [51]. 
50 Van der Veen (100/63) EU:C:1964:65, p573 (emphasis added). 
51 E.g. Pinna I (41/84) EU:C:1986:1 at [24]. 
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art. 68 establishes conflict rules to manage overlapping benefits, again prioritising the responsibility 
of the State where economic activity takes place. Moreover, excluding a benefit from the scope of 
Regulation 883/2004 does not make it immune from challenge under art. 7(2) of Regulation 
492/201152 – as discussed further below. 
Attaching conditions to the export of benefits is therefore a derogating measure and related 
concepts must be interpreted strictly.53 As stated in recital 37 of the Regulation, ‘[t]his means that 
[such provisions] can apply only to benefits which satisfy the specified conditions’. According to 
Chapter 9, exportability may be restricted when a cash benefit is both special and non-contributory, 
and it must also be listed in Annex X. However, the Court investigates the DNA of benefits in substance 
against its own criteria for these characteristics.54 On that basis, child benefits are neither special nor 
non-contributory; restricting their exportability should therefore be acknowledged for what it is: a 
major departure from current rules.  
Benefits ‘closely linked with the social environment’ of the host State can be made subject to 
residence conditions; but ‘benefits paid exclusively by reference to the number and, where 
appropriate, the age of the members of the family’ must be granted ‘wherever the recipient and his 
family reside’.55 In Commission v France, AG Van Gerven did not accept the French Government’s 
argument that ‘the supplementary allowance at issue…cannot be exported outside the national 
territory…because the amount thereof is closely connected with a specified economic and social 
environment’.56 In his view, ‘the argument that economic and social circumstances vary from one 
place to another, for instance differences in the cost of living, is no more applicable as between 
Member States than it is as between different regions in a single Member State. Furthermore, it takes 
no account of the costs resulting from mobility itself. Policy arguments based on general economic 
considerations of that kind are a matter of domestic politics and have no place before the Court’.57  
 Ironically, integration of family members into the host State was a strong driver of 
foundational case law on access to social advantages and still finds reflection in recital 6 of Regulation 
                                                          
52 E.g. Leclere and Deaconescu (C-43/99) EU:C:2001:303. 
53 E.g. Jauch (C-215/99) EU:C:2001:139 at [21]. 
54 E.g. Kersbergen-Lap and Dams-Schipper (C-154/05) EU:C:2006:449 at [30] (a special benefit ‘must either 
replace or supplement a social security benefit and be by its nature social assistance justified on economic and 
social grounds and fixed by legislation setting objective criteria’) and [36] (non-contributory concerns ‘how the 
benefit concerned is actually financed… whether that financing comes directly or indirectly from social 
contributions or from public resources’). See further, Commission v Parliament and Council (C-299/05) 
EU:C:2007:608. 
55 Lenoir (313/86) EU:C:1988:452 at [16]. 
56 AG Van Gerven in  Commisison v France (C-236/88) EU:C:1990:243 at [7] of the Opinion. 
57 Ibid. Note also the seemingly discordant positions taken by AG Kokott in Hosse (C-286/03) EU:C:2005:621 at 
[109] and [112] respectively of the Opinion. 
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492/2011.58 But what the case law respects and aims to facilitate overall are the choices that workers 
(have to) make. The Court has stated consistently that the purpose of what is now art. 67 of Regulation 
883/2004 is ‘to prevent Member States from making entitlement to and the amount of family benefits 
dependent on residence of the members of the worker's family in the Member State providing the 
benefits, so that [Union] workers are not deterred from exercising their right to freedom of 
movement’.59 The legal principles that resist restricting exportability were in many respects designed 
to meet the needs of frontier workers. The experience of split work/residence still includes that group 
but far exceeds it too. People increasingly spread their lives across different places for all kinds of 
reasons. The 2016 Decision punishes precisely this expression of contemporary free movement – 
moreover, as shown below, it did so for no demonstrably good reason.  
Meanwhile, the most pragmatic counter-argument comes from AG Lenz, who highlighted the 
self-defeating consequences of curbing exported family benefits: in response to the suggestion that 
there could be ‘serious financial consequences’ for a paying State ‘if spouses living abroad had to be 
taken into consideration’, he pointed out that the worker’s spouse ‘would undoubtedly have the right 
to move to the [host State] to live with her husband. If she exercised that right, the full amount of the 
benefit claimed by [the EU worker] in the main proceedings would unquestionably have to be paid’60 
– not to mention all other costs to the host State that result from family members living there. 
 
Regulation 883/2004 and equal treatment: relationship to other measures 
 
It was noted above that no parallel restrictions on in-work benefits were included for the self-
employed. The same ambiguity exists for indexation, but it is more striking here since both Article 48 
TFEU and Regulation 883/2004 explicitly refer to self-employed workers. The potential for intersection 
with Directive 2004/38 – and its guarantee of equal treatment in art. 24(1) in particular – was also 
discussed above and has relevance again here.61 But for the indexation proposal, there is a much 
bigger intersection of measures problem: ‘since Regulation [492/2011] is of general application 
regarding the free movement of workers, Article 7(2) thereof may apply to social advantages which, 
at the same time, fall specifically within the scope of Regulation [883/2004]’.62 Amending only 
Regulation 883/2004 could not therefore suffice.  
                                                          
58 E.g. AG Trabuchi in Mr and Mrs F (7/75) EU:C:1975:75, p696; Cabanis-Issarte (C-308/93) EU:C:1996:169 at 
[38]-[39]; Depesme and Kerrou (C-401/15 to C-403/15) EU:C:2016:955 at [44]. 
59 Hoever and Zachow (C-245/94 and C-312/94) EU:C:1996:379 at [34] (emphasis added); confirmed in e.g. 
Slanina (C-363/08) EU:C:2009:732 at [20]-[21]. 
60 AG Lenz in Acciardi (C-66/92) EU:C:1993:341 at [26] of the Opinion. 
61 On Directive 2004/38 and work/self-employment crossover, see Gusa (C-442/16) EU:C:2017:1004. 
62 Commission v Luxembourg (C-111/91) EU:C:1993:92 at [21]; confirmed in e.g. Martínez Sala (C-85/96) 
EU:C:1998:217 at [27] and Commission v Germany (C-206/10) EU:C:2011:283 at [39]. 
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The Court classifies child benefit as a social advantage under art. 7(2) of Regulation 
492/2011.63 Moreover, even restrictions on ‘special’ family benefits legitimately excluded from the 
scope of Regulation 883/2004 will be tested under the former provision.64 This second level of equal 
treatment compliance stems from the premise noted above: that social security measures ‘have as 
their basis, their framework and their bounds’ arts 45-48 TFEU. Other primary law guarantees also 
have relevance. In Dano, the Court (controversially) ruled out consideration of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in connection with national rules laying down conditions for special non-
contributory cash benefits under art. 70 of Regulation 883/2004.65 However, neither the EU 
legislature’s designation of benefits under that Regulation nor intended exclusions from its scope 
would enjoy immunity from judicial review. A proposal that varies the level of benefit paid on the basis 
of where family members live raises obvious questions about respect for privacy and family life.66 
  
Conditionality through links to host State society 
 
Testing residence requirements that condition access to social advantages is commonplace in case law 
on frontier workers. Article 36(2) of Regulation 492/2011 states that the Regulation ‘shall not affect 
measures taken in accordance with Article 48 [TFEU]’. In Hendrix, the Court acknowledged that 
statement and also pointed out that ‘the provisions of Regulation [883/2004] enacted to give effect 
to Article [48 TFEU] must be interpreted in the light of the objective of that article, which is to 
contribute to the establishment of the greatest possible freedom of movement for migrant workers’.67 
Nevertheless, the Court found the contested residence condition to be justifiable in principle – by 
invoking the benefit’s status as special and non-contributory per Regulation 883/2004.68 In practice, 
then, the second level of evaluation was no stricter than resolving the case on the basis of the Social 
Security Regulation in the first place. The elevation of integration requirements over equal treatment 
that results will now be considered in more detail.  
The indexation proposal challenges the sufficiency of the connection that a worker can 
establish with a host State if family members reside elsewhere. Recital 8 of Regulation 883/2004 
affirms that ‘[t]he general principle of equal treatment is of particular importance for workers who do 
not reside in the Member State of their employment, including frontier workers’. At a general level, 
                                                          
63 Martínez Sala (C-85/96) EU:C:1998:217 at [28]. 
64 E.g. Leclere and Deaconescu (C-43/99) EU:C:2001:303 at [31]. 
65 The reasoning was that Member States were not ‘implementing’ Union law per art. 51 of the Charter; see 
Dano (C-333/13) EU:C:2014:2358 at [87]-[91]. 
66 For Regulation 492/2011, e.g. Baumbast (C-413/99) EU:C:2002:493 at [72]. 
67 Hendrix (C-287/05) EU:C:2007:494 at [50]. The ‘greatest possible freedom’ objective is returned to below. 
68 Hendrix (C-287/05) EU:C:2007:494 at [55]-[57]; the determination of proportionality was left to the national 
court.  
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the Court recognises that commitment through an adapted version of the reasoning seen in the 
previous section for connections to the host State labour market: ‘compulsory membership of the 
[host State] social security system, which ensures that workers pay social contributions to that system, 
constitutes a sufficiently close connection with [host State] society to enable cross-border workers to 
benefit from the social advantage in question’.69 In Hartmann, a residence condition was attached to 
a child-raising allowance on the basis that it was ‘an instrument of national family policy intended to 
encourage the birth-rate’ in Germany and was granted ‘to benefit persons who, by their choice of 
residence, have established a real link with German society’.70 The applicant did not come within the 
personal scope of Regulation 883/2004, but the Court looked at the benefit as a social advantage 
under Regulation 492/2011 and observed that ‘under the German legislation in force at the material 
time, residence was not regarded as the only connecting link with the Member State concerned, and 
a substantial contribution to the national labour market also constituted a valid factor of integration 
into the society of that Member State. In those circumstances, the allowance at issue…could not be 
refused to a couple…who do not live in Germany, but one of whom works full-time in that State’.71  
The challenging consequences of this turn from equal treatment to integration unfolded 
further in Giersch, where the Court stated that ‘the frontier worker is not always integrated in the 
Member State of employment in the same way as a worker who is resident in that State’.72 In a 
statement with implications for both indexation and phased-in benefits, it suggested that ‘to ensure 
that the frontier worker who is a taxpayer and who makes social security contributions in [the host 
State] has a sufficient link with [that] society, the financial aid could be made conditional on the 
frontier worker…having worked in that Member State for a certain minimum period of time’ and noted 
the five year requirement (for permanent residence) in art. 16 of Directive 2004/38 in ‘another 
context’.73 Yet national legislation taking that guidance literally – i.e. codifying a five year residence 
condition before financial aid was granted to frontier workers – was later disapplied by the Court 
because of the ‘significant period of time’ that the applicants had worked in the host State.74 So what 
exactly is the Court trying to rule out – or to rule in – for residence conditions and frontier workers? 
                                                          
69 Commission v Germany (C-269/07) EU:C:2009:527 at [60] (emphasis added). 
70 Hartmann (C-212/05) EU:C:2007:437 at [32]-[33]. 
71 Hartmann (C-212/05) EU:C:2007:437 at [36]-[37] (emphasis added); cf. the narrower approach taken by AG 
Geelhoed (EU:C:2006:615). See further, Geven (C-213/05) EU:C:2007:438, returned to below. 
72 Giersch (C-20/12) EU:C:2013:411 at [65]. 
73 Giersch (C-20/12) EU:C:2013:411 at [80].  
74 Bragança Linares Verruga and Others (C-238/15) EU:C:2016:949 at [63]-[69]. This case law also concerns 
links between the children of migrant workers and the host State; see further, C Jacqueson ‘Any news from 
Luxembourg? On student aid, frontier workers and stepchildren: Bragança Linares Verruga and Depesme’ 
(2018) 54 CML Rev 901. 
 18 
AG Wathelet has been critical of the discord generated by the Hartmann/Giersch case law, 
contrasting it with clearer equal treatment reasoning in previous judgments: clarity now ‘blurred’ by 
‘introducing the concept of sufficient integration or genuine link with the host Member State 
into…case-law relating to workers’.75 He acknowledged that ‘the Court has accepted certain reasons 
as justifying legislation establishing a distinction between residents and non-residents pursuing a 
professional activity in the Member State concerned, according to their level of integration into the 
society of that State or their connection to it’ but remains ‘reticent about that development’.76 He 
frames Hartmann/Giersch as an ‘exception’ to the general rule that ‘as regards migrant workers and 
frontier workers, the fact that they have participated in the employment market of a Member State 
establishes, in principle, a sufficient link of integration with the society of that Member State, allowing 
them to benefit from the principle of equal treatment…as regards social advantages’ and argues that, 
as an exception, it must be ‘applied restrictively’.77  
Criticism notwithstanding, Hartmann/Giersch does introduce the contention that all workers 
are not equal under EU law.78 However, a crucial point of difference between these judgments and 
the 2016 indexation proposal is that workers potentially affected by the latter worked and lived in the 
host State. Thus to defend indexation of exported family benefits through Hartmann/Giersch would 
require a further significant limitation in an already uncertain sphere of already controversial 
limitation. Furthermore, the Court has spent decades emphasising that family members of an EU 
worker derive their rights from that worker – that they are ‘indirect recipients of the equal treatment 
granted to the worker’.79 To condition family benefit not with reference to the place of work or 
residence of the worker but to the place of residence of the derived rights-holder(s) would undercut 
that legal construction too.  
 
Demonstrating justification and proportionality  
It was argued above that if the 2016 amendments had proceeded as proposed – i.e. as directly 
discriminatory restrictions – they could not have survived legal challenge since the public interest 
arguments specified in the Decision (encouraging recruitment, reducing unemployment, protecting 
                                                          
75 AG Wathelet in Bragança Linares Verruga and Others (C-238/15) EU:C:2016:389 at [36] of the Opinion.  
76 AG Wathelet in Bragança Linares Verruga and Others (C-238/15) EU:C:2016:389 at [67]-[68] of the Opinion; 
note the same conflicted tone in [75]-[76] of the Opinion.   
77 AG Wathelet in Bragança Linares Verruga and Others (C-238/15) EU:C:2016:389 at [68] of the Opinion. The 
specific context of Luxembourg was also relevant in Giersch (C-20/12) EU:C:2013:411; see [70]-[80] of that 
judgment.  
78 Cf. AG Mengozzi in Giersch (C-20/12) EU:C:2013:70 at [30] of the Opinion: ‘When interpreting Article 7(2) of 
Regulation [492/2011], the Court has made no distinction between the concepts of migrant worker and 
frontier worker precisely because [the] Regulation…does not treat those two categories of worker differently’. 
79 Commission v Netherlands (C-542/09) EU:C:2012:346 at [48]. 
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vulnerable workers, and averting the risk of seriously undermining the sustainability of social security 
systems) are not derogation grounds in art. 45(3) TFEU. If the Commission had later drafted the 
amendments in the language of indirect discrimination, through residence rather than nationality 
conditions, public interest justification could be engaged. Two further questions would then arise. 
First, are the public interest grounds listed in the Decision applicable to the free movement of 
workers? Second, were either of the proposed mechanisms grounded in objective assessments that 
established their appropriateness and necessity i.e. did they satisfy a proportionality test? 
 
Justification, public interest and the free movement of workers 
 
Free movement law has adapted on the question of economically-driven public interest arguments. 
For workers, case law reflects a gradual shift from rejection of ‘purely economic’ arguments as 
unwarranted protectionism80 to recognition that public interest defences often have mixed ambitions 
– reflecting ‘the inescapable fact that every public service provided by our welfare states is dependent 
on there being sufficient budgetary means to finance it’.81 This compromise was expressed as follows 
in Commission v Cyprus: 
 
[W]hile reasons of a purely economic nature cannot constitute overriding reasons in the public 
interest justifying a restriction of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty…national 
legislation may, however, constitute a justified restriction on a fundamental freedom when it 
is dictated by reasons of an economic nature in the pursuit of an objective in the public 
interest…Therefore, it is conceivable that the risk of seriously undermining the financial 
balance of the social security system may constitute an overriding reason in the public interest 
capable of justifying the undermining of the provisions of the Treaty concerning the right of 
freedom of movement for workers.82  
 
However, in another line of case law, that position is displaced when consideration of equal treatment 
is added. In Commission v Netherlands, the Court seemed both to accept but also to limit its tolerance 
of integrated economic/social objectives, ruling that ‘although budgetary considerations may underlie 
a Member State’s choice of social policy and influence the nature or scope of the social protection 
measures which it wishes to adopt, they do not in themselves constitute an aim pursued by that policy 
and cannot therefore justify discrimination against migrant workers’.83 Otherwise, ‘the application and 
the scope of a rule of EU law as fundamental as non-discrimination on grounds of nationality might 
                                                          
80 As captured by the Court’s (continuing) rejection of ‘considerations of a purely economic nature’ e.g. 
Roeckler (C-137/04) EU:C:2006:106 at [24]. 
81 AG Sharpston in Bressol (C-73/08) EU:C:2009:396 at [91] of the Opinion. 
82 Commission v Cyprus (C-515/14) EU:C:2016:30 at [53]; confirmed in Case C-651/16 DW, EU:C:2018:162, 
paras 33-34. 
83 Commission v Netherlands (C-542/09) EU:C:2012:346 at [57]. 
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vary in time and place according to the state of the public finances of Member States’.84 Here, the 
judgments cited in support were drawn not from free movement but from social policy case law.85 
In contrast, the Court accepts ‘protection of public finances’ more straightforwardly to 
accommodate legislation curtailing social assistance when EU citizens are not working or self-
employed.86 In this context, as noted earlier, Directive 2004/38 expressly requires financial self-
sufficiency for lawful residence in a host State beyond three months, which in turn conditions EU equal 
treatment protection.87 Member States may impose general restrictions on EU citizens as a preventive 
defence against ‘the accumulation of all the individual claims which would be submitted to it’, which 
would be ‘bound’ to constitute an unreasonable burden on their social assistance systems.88 However, 
for workers, the Court (still) holds a harder line on general measures. For example, in ITC, it 
characterised the ‘systematic refusal’ of a benefit as ‘tantamount to an outright negation of the 
freedom of movement for [Union] workers laid down by Article [45 TFEU]’.89 The intersection of work 
and social assistance targeted by the proposal for phased-in benefits called for overt merging of these 
two different sectors of case law. Broader questions about work and welfare are picked up below. But 
arguments made above about the distinctive Treaty bases for citizenship rights and free movement of 
workers respectively, the particular legislative powers conferred by art. 21 TFEU in particular, and the 
retention of legal distinctiveness for workers in art. 7 of the Directive may be recalled in response for 
now; for they apply again here. 
 
Were the proposals proportionate? 
 
If the amendments were drafted as indirect discrimination, and if case law analogies requiring links 
either to the host State labour market (to date, applied only to jobseekers) and/or to host State society 
more generally (to date, applied in principle to frontier workers but not yet successfully) were 
significantly extended, and if the position in Commission v Netherlands on equal treatment and 
budgetary considerations with respect to workers was set aside, even that would not mean that the 
                                                          
84 Commission v Netherlands (C-542/09) EU:C:2012:346 at [58]. See similarly, AG Sharpston in Bressol (C-73/08) 
EU:C:2009:396 at [95] of the Opinion, where the ‘familiar “free rider” argument’ is countered by free 
movement being exercised on the basis of non-discrimination. 
85 Kutz-Bauer (C-187/00) EU:C:2003:168 at [59]; Nikoloudi (C-196/02) EU:C:2005:141 at [53]; Roks and Others 
(C-343/92) EU:C:1994:71 at [36]; and Steinicke (C-77/02) EU:C:2003:458 at [67]. On the intersection of social 
policy and free movement law, see T Van Peijpe, ‘EU limits for the personal scope of employment law’ (2012) 3 
European Labour Law Journal 35. 
86 Brey (C-140/12) EU:C:2013:565 at [55]; Commission v UK (C-308/14) EU:C:2016:43 at [80]. 
87 The Commission has proposed that this distinction is added to art. 4 of Regulation 883/2004 (see n99 
below). 
88 Alimanovic (C-67/14) EU:C:2015: 597 at [62]. 
89 ITC (C-208/05) EU:C:2007:16 at [44]; see also AG Lenz (EU:C:2006:649) at [102]-[104] of the Opinion. 
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proposals would overcome legal vulnerability. For perhaps the deepest weakness turns on 
proportionality. In short, the Decision exemplifies a detrimental and dangerous rejection of the critical 
importance of evidence: a rejection of decisions based on ‘solid and consistent data’90 and an 
acceptance instead of perceived or projected effects; dynamics that in many respects delivered Brexit 
itself despite the Decision’s efforts.  
The Court has consistently rejected arguments that defend restrictions of free movement by 
‘merely allud[ing], without providing any precise elements to substantiate [the] arguments, to a 
hypothetical financial burden which would be put on the national social security scheme’.91 This 
contrasts with the projected burden approach for social assistance claims by EU citizens who are not 
working or self-employed. For workers, standards of proof continue to require that the proportionality 
of a restriction must be demonstrated i.e. must be accompanied by ‘specific evidence substantiating 
[the] arguments. Such an objective, detailed analysis, supported by figures, must be capable of 
demonstrating, with solid and consistent data, that there are genuine risks to the balance of the social 
security system’.92 These principles are also reflected in the direction recently set by the legislator in 
Directive 2014/54, which commits the Member States to establishing national bodies ‘for the 
promotion, analysis, monitoring and support of equal treatment of Union workers and members of 
their family without discrimination on grounds of nationality, unjustified restrictions or obstacles to 
their right to free movement’ on the premise of evidence-based data.93  
For phased-in benefits, a Commission Declaration attached to the Decision (Annex VI) 
asserted ‘that the kind of information provided to it by the United Kingdom, in particular as it has not 
made full use of the transitional periods on free movement of workers which were provided for in 
recent Accession Acts, shows the type of exceptional situation that the proposed safeguard mechanism 
is intended to cover exists in the United Kingdom today. Accordingly, the United Kingdom would be 
justified in triggering the mechanism in the full expectation of obtaining approval’. This was a breath-
taking – and unsubstantiated – statement: none of the evidence published by the Commission94 or by 
the UK itself95 in the months preceding the 2016 negotiations reached or even implied anything like 
                                                          
90 Commission v Cyprus (C-515/14) EU:C:2016:30 at [54]. 
91 Rockler (C-137/04) EU:C:2006:106 at [26]. 
92 Commission v Cyprus (C-515/14) EU:C:2016:30 at [54]; see also, Commission v Netherlands (C-542/09) 
EU:C:2012:346 at [82]. 
93 Directive 2014/54/EU on measures facilitating the exercise of rights conferred on workers in the context of 
freedom of movement for workers, 2014 OJ L128/8, art. 4. 
94 E.g. ‘A fact finding analysis on the impact on the Member States' social security systems of the entitlements 
of non-active intra-EU migrants to special non-contributory cash benefits and healthcare granted on the basis 
of residence’, prepared for DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (2013), 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/c6de1d0a-2a5b-4e03-9efb-ed522e6a27f5.  
95 E.g. ‘Free movement of persons: a review of the balance of competences’, July 2014, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/free-movement-of-persons-review-of-the-balance-of-
competences. A 2015 House of Lords Review of the Balance of Competences explicitly criticised the ‘lack of 
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the Decision’s high threshold. More generally, research examining negative perceptions about the 
impact of EU citizens on national welfare systems within the UK96 and elsewhere97 continues to dispel 
them. Not even the (typically less demanding) appropriateness limb of proportionality was met: 
analysis of in-work benefit claimants in the UK suggests that the safeguard mechanism would have 
had little impact on inward migration from the EU since the proposed ‘restrictions are concentrated 
on a small share of newly arriving families’.98 
Finding evidence to justify the indexation amendment is even more problematic. The 
Commission was already working on a proposal to amend Regulation 883/2004 (since 2014) but an 
impact assessment was published only after the February 2016 Decision, in December of the same 
year.99 The Commission’s Proposal indicates that ‘a significant minority of Member States delegations 
favoured different coordination of benefits intended to replace income during child-raising periods’ 
(p6). But evidence to support reform of the rules on family benefits simply did not materialise. With 
the exception of the special situation of Luxembourg as an ‘outlier’, Annex XI of the Impact Assessment 
concluded that [t]he impact of the export of child benefits on total expenditure is quite limited for 
most of the Member States under the current rules…A change to another option has on average no 
significant impact on the public spending on family benefits’ (p66). On the balance of evidence 
gathered, the Commission Press Release issued on the publication of its proposal to amend Regulation 
883/2004 concluded that ‘[n]o indexation of child benefits is foreseen’ since ‘[l]ess than 1% of child 
benefits in the EU are exported from one Member State to another’.100 For the UK, statistics published 
                                                          
balance’ and ‘undue weight given to evidence reflecting the Government’s own position’ of the free 
movement of persons report (para. 28 of the Review, 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldeucom/140/140.pdf).  
96 E.g. A Sangiovanni ‘Non-discrimination, free movement, and in-work benefits in the European Union’ (2017) 
16 European Journal of Political Theory 143, 154-155. 
97 E.g. D Sindbjerg Martinsen and G Pons Rotger ‘The fiscal impact of EU immigration on the tax-financed 
welfare state: testing the “welfare burden” thesis’ (2017) European Union Politics, 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1465116517717340, which establishes that EU nationals have 
made a ‘significant positive net contribution to the Danish welfare state’. 
98 M Sumption and S Altorjai ‘EU migration, welfare benefits and EU membership’, Migration Observatory 
report, COMPAS, University of Oxford, UK, May 2016, http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/Report-EU_Migration_Welfare_Benefits.pdf. 
99 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems and regulation (EC) No 
987/2009 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, COM(2016) 815 final; 
see further the Impact Assessment (SWD(2016) 460 final) and the part containing Annex XI, 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/10102/2016/EN/SWD-2016-460-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-4.PDF.  
100 ‘Fairness at the heart of Commission's proposal to update EU rules on social security coordination’, 13 
December 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4301_en.htm. Changes are proposed only for 
family benefits intended to replace income during child-raising periods; see draft Recitals 11 and 35a, and 
draft art. 68b. 
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by the House of Commons before the European Council meeting on 18-19 February 2016 showed that 
only approx. 0.3% of child benefit was claimed for children living in another EEA State.101  
Annex XI of the Impact Assessment proceeded on the basis that only the option of ‘no export’ 
was ‘disregarded due to legal reasons’.102 The Commission offered no comment on the legality of 
indexation. However, it has been argued here that neither the phased-in benefits nor indexation 
amendments could be defended against established principles constituting the integrated system of 
free movement and equal treatment law. It is not only the proportionality test and its demands for 
evidence-based decisions that present problems. Other legal barriers discussed include: the narrow 
scope of the public policy derogation; the intersection of different legislative measures and of 
legislative measures and rights conferred by the Treaty, which constricts the discretion of the 
legislator; and the array of legal distinctions – in the Treaty, in legislation, and in case law – between 
EU citizens who work or are self-employed and those who do not. Transplanting ideas (or judgments) 
from one sector of EU law to another is not inherently problematic. But the problem here is not just 
that one or two or a few legal difficulties escaped the attention of the 2016 Decision. It is that an 
entire multiplicity of them did. In consequence, the proposals sought a more fundamental reform of 
the very conception of treating workers equally than has tended to be appreciated through its 
presentation of selective, under-reasoned connections. This is not about legal flexibility, but about 
legal instability.  
However, it can be acknowledged that the changing nature of work, disparities between work 
and subsistence, and the reality of asymmetric movement have not been properly worked through at 
EU level. Also, while the particular areas highlighted for reform in the 2016 Decision addressed 
perceived more than actual problems, the legacy of political pressure created by sustained efforts to 
call free movement rights into question is very real. Whether ‘complete’ equality of treatment can be 
sustained for all workers should be confronted, but this should happen only in stronger recognition 
that EU law sets parameters around appropriate reform, in both procedural and substantive terms. 
With these points in mind, the discussion that follows first examines foundational case law on the free 
movement of workers and identifies a corresponding foundational problem: attribution of the 
greatest possible freedom of movement as the principal objective of arts 45-48 TFEU. Reform that 
prioritises equal treatment and also emphasises a contribution from the Member States in sustaining 
free movement law is then discussed. 
 
 
                                                          
101 Sumption and Altorjai ‘EU migration, welfare benefits and EU membership’ (2016), 6, citing House of 
Commons Briefing Paper No CBP 7445.  
102 See pp 30 and 42 of the report on export of family benefits included in the Impact Assessment.  
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The shaping of a legal framework: the ‘greatest possible freedom’ as principal aim 
 
Choices made in the first substantive judgment on workers still shape the functioning and reach of 
free movement today. For present purposes, the foundational case law fixed two critical points: first, 
free movement rights are about much more than equal treatment with host State workers; second, 
certain concepts should be defined and controlled at EU level.  
 
Origins: the ‘greatest possible freedom’ as principal aim 
 
The Court first considered the ‘principal objective’ of arts 45-48 TFEU in Unger, a judgment delivered 
in March 1964.103 The case concerned the definition of ‘wage-earner or assimilated worker’ for the 
purposes of the Social Security Regulation. Unlike art. 45 TFEU, art. 48 does not confer directly 
effective rights. But the Commission linked the shared purpose of the provisions and shaped its 
submission around equal treatment: 
 
Regulations…have as their object the creation of a unified law in the Member States; it follows 
from this that the concepts which they contain are in principle vested with a Community 
character. This does not however prevent Community law from employing in exceptional 
circumstances concepts borrowed from national law, especially when it is concerned with 
adapting the application of national legislation to the rules of Community law…The principal 
object of [Articles 45-48 TFEU] is to ensure that each Member State guarantees the nationals 
of other Member States the same treatment as that guaranteed to its own nationals, including 
the application of the provisions in force relating to social security. On the other hand, it is not 
the intention of the Treaty to replace national legislation by other rules. Consequently it is not 
the object either of the Treaty or of the provisions in implementation thereof to determine 
by a legislative Community measure who is a ‘wage-earner’.104 
 
However, the Court went much further:  
 
Article [48 TFEU] is [in] Part Two of the Treaty (‘Foundations of the Community’). The 
establishment of as complete a freedom of movement for workers as possible, which thus 
forms part of the ‘foundations’ of the Community, therefore constitutes the principal objective 
of Article [48] and thereby conditions the interpretation of the regulations adopted in 
implementation of that Article. Articles [45-48] of the Treaty, by the very fact of establishing 
freedom of movement for ‘workers’, have given Community scope to this term. If the 
definition of this term were a matter within the competence of national law, it would 
therefore be possible for each Member State to modify the meaning of the concept of 
'migrant worker' and to eliminate at will the protection afforded by the Treaty to certain 
categories of person…Articles [45-48] would therefore be deprived of all effect and the above-
mentioned objectives of the Treaty would be frustrated….105 
                                                          
103 Unger (75/63) EU:C:1964:19. 
104 Unger (75/63) EU:C:1964:19, p182 (emphasis added). 
105 Unger (75/63) EU:C:1964:19 at [1] (emphasis added). 
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Three months later, in Nonnenmacher, the ‘principal objective’ assigned to art. 48 TFEU in Unger 
became a generalised statement about arts 45-48 TFEU collectively. Moreover, ‘[i]n case of doubt 
[these] Articles and the measures taken in implementation of them must therefore be construed so 
as to avoid placing migrant workers in an unfavourable legal position’.106 
The 1964 judgments determined how free movement law would apply to workers,107 but also 
a philosophy for achieving the common market and an understanding of the relationship between the 
Union and the Member States that presages the workings of primacy, unveiled by the Court shortly 
afterwards.108 On the common market, the Court in Nonnenmacher already expressed the ‘elimination 
of legislative obstacles’ and ‘unfavourable legal position’ conception of restrictions normally 
associated with later judgments.109 It acknowledged that free movement could be secured 
‘particularly by’ the abolition of nationality discrimination110 – that it ‘entails’ such a prohibition.111 
But equal treatment with host State workers, though fundamental on its own terms,112 was never the 
principal objective. This might explain how little discussion of equal treatment actually occurs in the 
case law, except for judgments on taxation in which identification of an appropriate comparator is 
more pressing.113 But we should not forget that ‘[w]ithout equal treatment of goods, people, services 
and capital…no internal market could exist or be sustained’.114 
On the relationship between the Union and the Member States, Unger used quite dramatic 
language to suggest that accepting national competence for the definition of worker would ‘eliminate 
at will the protection afforded by the Treaty’ with the result that arts 45-48 TFEU would be ‘deprived 
of all effect’.115 But the timing of the judgment – just before Costa – should be remembered: EU law 
                                                          
106 Nonnenmacher (92/63) EU:C:1964:40 at [1]. Confirmed in e.g. Spruyt (284/84) EU:C:1986:79 at [18]; Jauch 
(C-215/99) EU:C:2001:139 at [20]; da Silva Martins (C-388/09) EU:C:2011:439 at [70]; and Commission v Cyprus 
(C-515/14) EU:C:2016:30 at [34]. 
107 Though it is striking that, in several early cases, protecting the person because of circumstances connected 
to the fact of movement – to a cross-border dimension – was more pertinent than any connection to work or 
other economic activity: e.g. Bertholet (31/64) EU:C:1965:18; van Dijk (33/64) EU:C:1965:19; Singer (44/65) 
EU:C:1965:109; SNCFL (27/69) EU:C:1969:56. 
108 Costa v ENEL (6/64) EU:C:1964:66. 
109 Van Binsbergen (33/74) EU:C:1974:131; Dassonville (8/74) EU:C:1974:82. 
110 Ciechelski (1/67) EU:C:1967:27, p188. 
111 Commission v France (167/73) EU:C:1974:35 at [44]. 
112 E.g. Frilli (1/72) EU:C:1972:56 at [18]-[19]; Sotgiu (152/73) EU:C:1974:13 at [4]. 
113 E.g. Schumacker (C-279/93) EU:C:1995:31; Gschwind (C-391/97) EU:C:1999:409; Wallentin (C-169/03) 
EU:C:2004:403. 
114 J Paju, The European Union and Social Security Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017) 185. 
115 Reflecting the premise of coordination (not harmonisation), Regulations 1408/71 and 883/2004 refer for 
the implementation of their provisions to employed or self-employed activity as defined in national social 
security legislation (see art. 1(a) and 1(b) of Regulation 883/2004 and e.g.  De Jaeck (C-340/94) EU:C:1997:43 
at [34]; Hervein and Hervillier (C-221/95) EU:C:1997:47 at [22]; and Partena (C-137/11) EU:C:2012:593 at [50]. 
This contrasts with the EU-level definition of ‘migrant worker’ and is returned to below. 
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was literally under construction and the statement in Costa that ‘[t]he obligations undertaken under 
the Treaty…would not be unconditional, but merely contingent, if they could be called in question by 
subsequent legislative acts of the signatories’ indicates the broader concern.116 Also, at the time, 
contested national restrictions were often directly discriminatory as they pre-dated the creation of 
the EEC. Later case law tended to emphasise instead the effectiveness of rights.117  
But national rules setting thresholds for work would ‘call into question’ the greatest possible 
freedom objective; not the equal treatment of workers who move. Nevertheless, the link between 
effectiveness and Union ownership of concepts that stems from Unger is now deeply entrenched:118 
the Court goes as far as saying that the ‘unity’ of EU law, which is ‘fundamental to the existence of the 
Union’, depends upon it.119 However, securing uniform application of EU law can also be mistakenly 
conflated with securing equal treatment,120 a point returned to below. 
 
Implications: ‘special’ treatment? 
 
Reflecting Nonnenmacher, the elimination of ‘obstacles to the mobility of workers’ was added to the 
preamble to Regulation 1612/68 – now recital 6 of Regulation 492/2011 – and drawn from directly by 
the Court.121 As noted above, early case law tended to involve discrimination (direct or indirect) but 
the obstacles approach had more independent effect in later assessments of non-discriminatory 
restrictions, which sought to temper disadvantage or deterrence experienced by the worker.122 That 
case law in turn generated the idea that an EU national should not be ‘penalised’ for having exercised 
free movement rights in the past.123 
 As Brexit has all too unfortunately demonstrated, reciting only rights-centred statements of 
free movement law would suggest unlimited freedom. In reality, limits and qualifications were always 
built into the system. Derogation, justification and proportionality were discussed already above. 
Additionally, for non-discriminatory measures, a requirement to establish a connecting factor 
between the contested rule and the right claimed means that not every limitation is a restriction of 
free movement for the purposes of the Treaty.124 Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the aim of 
eliminating obstacles, premised on a ‘greatest possible freedom’ objective, creates a sphere of relative 
                                                          
116 Costa v ENEL (6/64) EU:C:1964:66, p594. 
117 E.g. Antonissen (C-292/89) EU:C:1991:80 at [16].  
118 E.g. Levin (53/81) EU:C:1982:105 at [15]; see further below. 
119 Commission v Belgium (149/79) EU:C:1980:297 at [19]. 
120 E.g. Lebon (316/85) EU:C:1987:302 at [21]; Cabanis-Issarte (C-308/93) EU:C:1996:169 at [31]. 
121 E.g. Scutari (76/72) EU:C:1973:46 at [13]; Casagrande (9/74) EU:C:1974:74 at [6]. 
122 E.g. Bosman (C-415/93) EU:C:1995:463;  Eind (C-291/05) EU:C:2007:771. 
123 E.g. Singh (C-370/90) EU:C:1992:296; Terhoeve (C-18/95) EU:C:1999:22. 
124 E.g. S and G, EU:C:2014:136 (C-457/12) [39]-[43]. 
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privilege for EU workers. In that sense, ‘the Court has shown no reluctance to give a wide 
interpretation to those [Union] rules which benefit migrant workers, even when the consequence is 
to place them at an advantage compared with workers who spend the whole of their working life in 
one State’.125 This is normally presented as reverse discrimination ‘against’ host State workers. But it 
can also be expressed conversely: EU workers can benefit from special, not equal, treatment 
compared to host State workers.  
The Commission has invoked the comparator dimension of equal treatment to refute that 
perception. For example, in Giuliani, it argued that ‘[t]he position of a migrant worker who has had 
the courage and the resourcefulness to move to another State in order to take up employment cannot 
be compared with that of a worker who has spent his whole working life in one Member State. There 
can be no question therefore of migrant advantage’.126 In Mura, the Court reasoned similarly that 
‘[t]he charge that migrant workers obtain an advantage over workers who have never left their own 
country cannot be accepted, since no discrimination can arise in legal situations which are not 
comparable’.127 But the fact that preferable treatment can continue after a worker returns to their 
home State exposes the wider range of ‘migrant advantage’.  
 The tension between equal treatment and ‘special’ treatment is well illustrated by Reed. The 
Netherlands characterised the granting of rights to family members of workers – conferred at the time 
by art. 10 of Regulation 1612/68 – as being ‘not a result of the principle of non-discrimination but 
rather an independent right granted under Community law’.128 AG Lenz distinguished similarly 
between the guarantee of equal treatment in art. 45(2) TFEU, and the independent or positive rights 
in art. 45(3). In his view, the latter ‘are granted to [Union] nationals in order to give practical effect to 
the principle of freedom of movement, and not to place them in the same position as the nationals of 
the host State’.129 Conversely, EU law enables the placing of restrictions on EU nationals that cannot 
be replicated for a State’s own nationals, deportation being the obvious example. Here, EU law still 
plays a supervisory role through the fixing of boundaries (e.g. compliance with proportionality and 
with EU fundamental rights) around the discretion of the Member States,130 a critical function 
returned to below.  
For present purposes, it is significant that AG Lenz focused on the role of legislation regarding 
independent or positive rights that go beyond equal treatment with host State workers since art. 10 
of Regulation 1612/68 did not extend residence rights to partners other than spouses. However, the 
                                                          
125 AG Capotorti in Maris (55/77) EU:C:1977:186, p2338. 
126 Giuliani (32/7) EU:C:1977:165, p1862. 
127 Mura (22/77) EU:C:1977:154 at [9]. 
128 Reed (59/85) EU:C:1986:157 at [19] (emphasis added).  
129 AG Lenz in Reed (59/85) EU:C:1986:62, p1289. 
130 E.g. Oteiza Olazabal (C-100/01) EU:C:2002:712 at [41]-[43]. 
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Commission and ultimately the Court used art. 7(2) of the Regulation instead, engaging equal 
treatment and the social advantages concept to extend the application to EU workers of national rules 
conferring residence rights on the partners of Dutch nationals.131 AG Lenz had argued against that on 
the basis that ‘[t]he legal position of [an EU] national as a result of the prohibition of discrimination 
may…vary according to the Member State…in question’.132 But the Court’s approach invokes equal 
treatment so that regulatory differences across Member States can persist, which fits with another 
line of case law exemplified by Kenny:  
 
By prohibiting every Member State from applying its law differently on the ground of 
nationality…Articles [18 and 45 TFEU] are not concerned with any disparities in treatment 
which may result, between Member States, from divergences existing between the laws of 
the various Member States, so long as the latter affect all persons subject to them in 
accordance with objective criteria and without regard to their nationality.133 
 
Essentially, when rules are not harmonised at EU level, States (legitimately) make diverse regulatory 
choices; and so long as the resulting rules and practices are also applied to EU workers, EU law is ‘not 
concerned’. In these circumstances, EU law concentrates on equal treatment within each State’s 
employment market and not across the internal market as a whole – a natural offshoot of social 
security coordination (Kenny), but a more selective approach to rights drawn from art. 45 TFEU and 
developed further in legislation (Reed). But how then is the pragmatism of Reed reconciled with the 
concern for uniform application of EU rights in Unger? 134  
 Examining the case law foundations thus reveals some paradoxes: workers from other States 
must be treated equally with host State workers, yet the former are not comparable with the latter in 
certain situations. Effectiveness of rights is ensured by requiring concepts to be defined uniformly at 
EU level, yet EU law is not consistently concerned with disparities in treatment that result from 
divergences in national laws. Equal treatment has exhibited both fundamental and incidental 
significance. Most crucially, the ‘greatest possible freedom’ objective has generated a propulsion 
beyond equal treatment that has ended up rendering the latter both less visible and more fragile: 
vulnerability laid bare in the discriminatory timbre of the 2016 Decision. If we brand free movement 
                                                          
131 AG Lenz reached the opposite conclusion i.e. since family member residence rights were addressed by 
Article 10 of the Regulation, ‘it cannot be assumed that the Member States have restricted their freedom of 
action further than is to be inferred from’ that measure, noting that ‘in determining the category of persons 
entitled to accompany a worker the Member States went beyond the minimum duty laid down in the Treaty’ 
(AG Lenz in Reed (59/85) EU:C:1986:62, pp1291-1292). 
132 AG Lenz in Reed (59/85) EU:C:1986:62, p1289. 
133 Kenny (1/78) EU:C:1978:140 at [18]; confirmed in e.g. Commission v France (236/88) EU:C:1990:303 at [15]. 
In Kenny, AG Mayras (EU:C:1978:111, p1505) drew this analysis from competition law, citing Wilhelm (14/68) 
EU:C:1969:4 at [13]. 
134 Consider also the broader aim of ‘merg[ing] the national markets into a single market’ (Gaston Schul 
(15/81) EU:C:1982:135 at [33]). However, that aim is already softened by the internal market’s reliance in 
reality on mutual recognition; see generally, S Weatherill ‘The several internal markets’ (2017) 36 YEL 125. 
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as the ‘problem’ then limiting movement naturally becomes the solution. But we then obscure the 
damage done to equal treatment. In what follows, the presumed affiliation between uniform 
application and equal treatment is therefore re-opened. 
 
Sustaining free movement of workers as work itself evolves 
 
It was argued above that the 2016 Decision did not address problems that were demonstrated, or at 
least not at the scale required by either the language of the Decision itself or the standards of proof 
applied in proportionality review generally. It was also seen that, separately from Brexit, a ‘significant 
minority’ of States135 had raised questions about exported family benefits. At the same time, recent 
fissures in the reasoning of the Court underline a sense that sustaining an entirely unchanged legal 
framework for the free movement for workers is unrealistic. Three broad themes underline the 
exploration of reform that follows: renewing equal treatment of EU workers as a value to be upheld; 
the changing nature of work; and shared Union/Member State guardianship of free movement.  
It is first important to clarify what is not being claimed – that free movement law consists of 
untouchable truths impervious to any reform – as well as the ‘problems’ with free movement (law) 
with which the reform argument seeks to connect. As Brexit negotiations continue, the impact of 
different contributory factors is still being unpicked.136 Did free movement become a problem because 
many more people now move, and/or because they do not move evenly around the Member States? 
Or was free movement turned into a problem as deliberate political displacement activity – to distract 
from national regulatory failures and externalise policy challenges? How much of what happened is 
UK-specific, or at least UK-containable? We need to be very careful about properly connecting cause 
and effect in any discussion related to Brexit specifically. But it was also acknowledged above that 
even if the branding of free movement as a problem responds to situations that are more constructed 
than concrete, the pressure that such strategies generate is real. The idea of free movement as 
confounding national burden more than founding Union value will not easily be repaired. It is 
interesting that the unified position of EU27 that the four freedoms ‘are indivisible and there can be 
no “cherry picking”’ continues to hold, suggesting a refreshment of political commitment to free 
movement of persons as a result.137 But it is also true that the same 27 were prepared to sanction 
openly discriminatory treatment of EU workers just two years earlier.  
                                                          
135 Exportation of benefits has also been questioned by EEA States; see EFTA Surveillance Authority v Kingdom 
of Norway (E-06/12) [2013] EFTA Ct. Rep. 618. 
136 E.g. J Shaw ‘Between law and political truth? Member State preferences, EU free movement rules and 
national immigration law’ (2015) 17 CYELS 247. 
137 At the time of writing, reconfirmed by the European Council in its (Art. 50) (23 March 2018) – Guidelines, 
EUCO XT 20001/18 at [7]. 
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However, the more challenging task is to acknowledge that minimalist equal treatment law is 
not securing EU rights; and to confront the problematic mismatch between free movement law and 
free movement practice in the interests of sustaining rather than undermining free movement itself. 
In other words, this discussion aims to connect free movement ‘problems’ to practical more than 
ideological questions.  
In that light, a first concern is that aspects of free movement law – much of which was 
conceived in the 1960s – no longer properly reflect how movement is exercised in reality. For example, 
the unevenness of intra-EU mobility was noted above, but asymmetries do not find easy resolution in 
a uniformity-driven approach to free movement.138 Similarly, we saw that EU legislation does not deal 
well with lives split across different States, not just as a temporary transition to ‘full’ free movement 
but as the long-term life experience of many (more) EU nationals.139  
Second, what constitutes ‘work’ in the first place is undergoing significant mutation. For 
example, binary distinctions between work and self-employment have blurred, making the applicable 
regulatory framework harder to identify – as burgeoning case law, at both national and EU levels, on 
the status and rights of participants in the gig economy shows just now. Additionally, attaching sharply 
decisive legal significance to economic activity is disputable when it cannot be taken for granted that 
work or self-employment produces financial self-subsistence.140 Third, and relatedly, protection of 
vulnerable workers is then both more precarious and more urgent.  
EU legislation on workers was designed to manage mobility in altogether different economic, 
geographical, social and technological contexts. AG Geelhoed recognised this in Baumbast nearly 20 
years ago, observing that ’Regulation No 1612/68 was adopted at the high-water mark of industrial 
mass production when employment conditions were relatively stable. The Community legislature was 
able to assume that the working cycle had a certain permanence’.141 He then highlighted ‘the 
consequences of a divorce, the presence of children from a previous relationship or of families with 
different nationalities, including nationals of non-Member States, professional mobility and the 
separation of the place of residence and the place of work’, pointing out that ‘none of these 
phenomena are really new; it is merely that the intensity with which and the scale on which they now 
occur have become so considerable that the [Union] legislature must take account of them’.142  
                                                          
138 For an exception, see AG Sharpston in Bressol (C-73/08) EU:C:2009:396 at [106]-[112] and [151]-[154] of the 
Opinion. 
139 See further, Y Orens, P Minderhoud and J De Coninck, Comparative Report: Frontier workers in the EU, 
FreSsco, European Commission, January 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1098&langId=en). 
140 See further, G Davies ‘Migrant Union citizens and social assistance: trying to be reasonable about self-
sufficiency’, College of Europe Research Papers in Law 2/2016, https://www.coleurope.eu/study/european-
legal-studies/research-activities/research-papers-law, 5. 
141 AG Geelhoed in Baumbast (C-413/99) EU:C:2001:385 at [24] of the Opinion (emphasis added).  
142 AG Geelhoed in Baumbast (C-413/99) EU:C:2001:385 at [26] of the Opinion (emphasis added). 
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But reflection on appropriate reform also raises questions about what can/should be done at 
Union level and what can/should be done at national level. The Commission recognises that ‘[i]n spite 
of recent improvements in economic and social conditions across Europe, the legacy of the crisis of 
the last decade is still far-reaching, from long-term unemployment and youth unemployment to risks 
of poverty in many parts of Europe. At the same time, every Member State is facing the rapid changes 
taking place in our societies and the world of work’.143 The November 2017 European Pillar of Social 
Rights includes the promise that ‘[a]dequate minimum wages shall be ensured, in a way that provide 
for the satisfaction of the needs of the worker and his/her family in the light of national economic and 
social conditions, whilst safeguarding access to employment and incentives to seek work. In-work 
poverty shall be prevented’.144 However, policy preferences for achieving these goals – openness to 
universal basic income, for example – differ greatly across the Member States; as does the extent of 
the inequality gap itself.  
The Commission acknowledges EU competence limits, noting that ‘[m]ost of the tools 
required to deliver on the Pillar are in the hands of local, regional and national authorities, as well as 
the social partners, and civil society at large. The European Union – and the European Commission in 
particular – can help by setting the framework, giving the direction and establishing a level-playing 
field, in full respect of the specifici[ti]es of national circumstances and institutional set-ups’.145 Thus 
while the EU legislator has a clear mandate to regulate the movement of workers, it has less 
straightforward capacity to settle questions at the intersection of work and welfare. Moreover, EU 
competence on working conditions, social security and the social protection of workers is limited by 
art. 153(1) TFEU to supporting competence. The Commission could certainly undertake 
comprehensive review of existing legislation to address instances of misfit between the legal 
framework and how rights are exercised in practice. But questions at the intersection of work and 
welfare are arguably too ‘big’ for the EU to resolve unilaterally146 or at least without more meaningful 
State input in parallel. That is not to say that the EU has no part to play,147 but we may need to shift 
expectations to coordination and outer boundaries guardianship as an interim step; to recognise that 
transformative discussions about the nature of work and inequality must happen urgently but that 
they may need to happen more intensively at national level first. Moreover, focusing only on the EU 
                                                          
143 Communication from the European Commission, Establishing a European Pillar of Social Rights, COM(2017) 
250 final at [2]. 
144 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/social-summit-european-pillar-social-rights-
booklet_en.pdf at [6].  
145 COM(2017) 250 final, para. 1.  
146 Discussing some options for EU legislative change, see Davies ‘Migrant Union citizens and social assistance: 
trying to be reasonable about self-sufficiency’ (2016), 24. 
147 E.g. discussing the option of a ‘joint fund...to defray the additional costs arising from the cross-border 
movement of persons’, see Paju, The European Union and Social Security Law (2017), 194-195. 
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dimension enables the continuation of a leadership vacuum with respect to expectations of the 
Member States. 
The implication of putting equal treatment at the centre of potential reform means that the 
discussion that follows therefore reopens part of the Unger legacy i.e. that ‘nothing in Articles [45-48] 
of the Treaty leads to the conclusion that these provisions have left the definition of the term “worker” 
to national legislation’. Specifically, beyond the narrower context of social security coordination, could 
‘who’ a worker is could be linked explicitly to national rules?148 I am not pretending that the personal 
scope of art. 45 TFEU would be unaffected: EU nationals not meeting a State’s criteria for work (or 
self-employment) would need to meet Directive 2004/38’s alternative conditions for lawful residence 
under EU law. But nor can we keep pretending that this is not happening already.149 Challenging the 
fitness for purpose of the Directive’s lawful residence criteria is a related but distinct, much broader 
question. Relying on an EU definition of worker to displace national thresholds that would otherwise 
apply cannot be a long-term proxy for dealing with far more widespread and deeply-rooted 
inequalities.150 Choosing the 2016 Decision’s reform route to sanction discrimination against EU 
workers does little to unscramble the challenges actually affecting the lives of those who move. And 
if we do nothing, equal treatment will continue to be eroded stealthily through case law, as seen in 
the increasingly confusing judgments for frontier workers. Sharing responsibility for free movement 
more consciously across EU and national levels would reconfigure premises of the legal framework 
but it will also be shown that those premises are not inherent in that framework. 
 
The worker as a concept of (only) Union law 
 
As seen in the previous section, Unger established not only the greatest possible freedom objective 
but also that arts 45-48 TFEU, ‘by the very fact of establishing freedom of movement for “workers”, 
have given [Union] scope to this term’.151 The Court then forged an explicit link between effectiveness 
of rights and uniform application of the concept of worker.152 At first, this reasoning was mainly 
applied in cases on attempted derogation. For example, on the public service exception in art. 45(4) 
TFEU, the Court ruled that ‘recourse to provisions of the domestic legal systems to restrict the scope 
of the provisions of Community law would have the effect of impairing the unity and efficacy of that 
                                                          
148 E.g. for the UK, see https://www.gov.uk/employment-status/worker. 
149 E.g. for the UK, see C O’Brien ‘The pillory, the precipice and the slippery slope: the profound effects of the 
UK’s legal reform programme targeting EU migrants’ (2015) 37 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 111. 
150 For exposition and analysis underpinned by extensive national data, see C O’Brien, E Spaventa and J De 
Coninck, The concept of worker under Article 45 TFEU and certain non-standard forms of employment, FreSsco, 
European Commission, Comparative Report 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1098&langId=en.  
151 Unger (75/63) EU:C:1964:19 at [1]. 
152 E.g. Manpower (35/70) EU:C:1970:120 [17]-[18]; Angenieux (13/73) EU:C:1973:92 at [21]. 
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law and consequently cannot be accepted’.153 In Levin, the implications of Unger materialised in a 
different sense through articulation of the Court’s definition of worker.  
Levin concerned whether national minimum wage thresholds could delineate who should be 
a worker under EU law. The applicant was a part-time worker, earning less than the minimum legal 
wage in the Netherlands. No general right to reside existed in EU law at the time. The Netherlands 
and Denmark raised questions about the extent of work performed: the former advocated ‘activity 
which is full and complete in both the social and economic spheres and which enables the worker at 
least to provide himself with means of support’ while the latter suggested that free movement rights 
are ‘conferred only on those persons who play a role in the economic life of the Member States, 
whereas persons who do not or have not pursued an occupation have under the [Union] rules 
applicable at present no right of residence in another Member State’.154 On that basis, the Danish 
Government submission considered that the term migrant worker ‘implies that the persons concerned 
work a normal number of hours’, which it linked to applicable national rules. It also pointed out that 
EU legislation had not ‘laid down specific criteria enabling the respective categories of employed or 
self-employed persons entitled to obtain a residence permit…to be defined’ and in consequence ‘the 
Member States may themselves lay down certain minimum rules concerning the period of work and 
income…which a foreign national must satisfy in order to be granted a residence permit’.155 Critically, 
the argument did recognise the principle of equal treatment, emphasising that rules or administrative 
practices more restrictive than those applied to a State’s own nationals could not be accepted.156 
 The Commission acknowledged political concerns around work levels below national 
minimum wage thresholds as well as the consequences for public funds through supplementary social 
assistance. But following the logic of Unger (and in contrast to its submission in that case), it rejected 
the idea of national ‘modification’ of Union rights.157 The Court took the same route, reinforcing that 
the term worker must have a Union meaning and cautioning that ‘enjoyment of the rights conferred 
by the principle of freedom of movement for workers could not be made subject to the criterion of 
what the legislation of the host State declares to be a minimum wage, so that the field of application 
ratione personae of the [Union] rules…might vary from one Member State to another’.158 It then 
provided a Union-wide definition of work i.e. ‘pursuit of effective and genuine activities, to the 
exclusion of activities on such a small scale as to be regarded as purely marginal and ancillary’.159  
                                                          
153 Commission v Belgium (149/79) EU:C:1980:297 at [19]. 
154 Levin (53/81) EU:C:1982:105, pp 1040 and 1041 respectively. 
155 Levin (53/81) EU:C:1982:105, p1041. 
156 Levin (53/81) EU:C:1982:105, pp1041-1042.  
157 Levin (53/81) EU:C:1982:105, pp1043-1044. 
158 Levin (53/81) EU:C:1982:105 at [12]. 
159 Levin (53/81) EU:C:1982:105 at [17]; see further Lawrie-Blum (66/85) EU:C:1986:284.  
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The Court recognised that part-time work was likely to result in earnings below national 
subsistence levels but stressed that it ‘constitutes for a large number of persons an effective means 
of improving their living conditions’ and therefore ‘the effectiveness of [Union] law would be impaired 
and the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty would be jeopardized if the enjoyment of rights 
conferred by the principle of freedom of movement for workers were reserved solely to persons 
engaged in full-time employment and earning, as a result, a wage at least equivalent to the guaranteed 
minimum wage’.160 This reasoning resonates perfectly with the greatest possible freedom objective. 
But through an equal treatment lens, it is less clear why the fact that rules might ‘vary from one 
Member State to another’ transgresses a Treaty enabling movement around different States.  
The decision in Kempf clarified that supplementary assistance from public funds does not 
negate worker status under EU law provided that the ‘effective and genuine’ Levin criteria are met.161 
The Court does leave space for invocation of national rules on minimum wage or minimum hours but 
in an indicative sense only.162 The Union definition therefore provides another example of special 
treatment of EU workers: it requires national authorities to apply different considerations than those 
applied to its own nationals, which are developed in line with the relevant national context. It would 
be an exaggeration to say that this approach caused the us/them dichotomy magnified in current 
debates about the extent to which EU nationals should be supported by host States, but it might be 
naïve to see no connection at all. There is also a note of discord between the reasoning of the Court 
on subsistence and work when compared with how subsistence outside the context of work or self-
employment is now addressed by Directive 2004/38 and related case law (as emphasised above: the 
fitness for purpose of that framework on its own terms being a related but wider question). 
 It is particularly important to probe past the fiction that equal treatment is secured by uniform 
application of Union-wide definitions. Legislation at national and EU levels raises distinct questions in 
this respect. First, on national legislation, a significant degree of local discretion is already built into 
the Union definition, the less positive side of which was highlighted in Genc where the referring court 
complained that ‘the Court’s case-law does not contain a threshold, determined on the basis of 
working time and level of remuneration, below which an activity would have to be regarded as being 
marginal and ancillary, and that this contributes to a lack of precision in the concept of marginal and 
ancillary activity’.163 Yet we know that threshold rules are applied more definitively than indicatively 
                                                          
160 Levin (53/81) EU:C:1982:105 at [15]. 
161 Kempf (139/85) EU:C:1986:223 at [14]-[15]. 
162 E.g. Raulin (C-357/89) EU:C:1992:87 at [14]. 
163 Genc (C-14/09) EU:C:2010:57 at [29]. The Court merely underlined the ‘relationship of close cooperation’ 
upon which Article 267 TFEU is premised. On ambiguities in the Court’s definitions, see Reynolds 
‘(De)constructing the road to Brexit: paving the way to further limitations on free movement and equal 
treatment?’ (2017), 81. 
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to exclude EU nationals from the protection of EU law in practice – including in situations where they 
are not applied to home State nationals.164 The influence of apparently non-binding administrative 
guidelines is another problematically grey area in national shaping of EU rights.165  
Second, on EU legislation, and even more basically, had the 2016 proposals been implemented 
the fact that the resulting legislative amendments would be applied ‘uniformly’ would have done little 
to overcome the patently unequal treatment for which they would have provided.  
 
Legal barriers – or routes? – to change 
 
Case law permitting disparities in national rules was discussed above. While Kenny concerned 
Regulation 1408/71 – defined by coordination and therefore accommodation of national rules – Reed 
showed the same thinking applied to Regulation 1612/68. In Martínez Sala, the Court confirmed that 
‘there is no single definition of worker in [Union] law: it varies according to the area in which the 
definition is to be applied…[T]he definition of worker used in the context of Article [45 TFEU] and 
Regulation [492/2011] does not necessarily coincide with the definition applied in relation to Article 
[48 TFEU] and Regulation [883/2004]’.166 In De Jaeck, AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer reasoned that ‘Article 
[45 TFEU] and Regulation [492/2011] confer rights of [Union] origin on migrant workers, so that it is 
necessary to arrive at a [Union] definition which makes it possible to identify who has those rights, 
whereas Article [48 TFEU] only provides for the coordination of national social security schemes’.167 
However, we have also seen that ‘regulations in the field of social security have as their basis, their 
framework and their bounds Articles [45-48 TFEU]’.168 In that light, the idea that Regulation 883/2004 
does not give effect to ‘rights of Union origin’ is odd since the measure is needed precisely –  only – 
because EU free movement rights are exercised.169 Absence of judicial concern about different 
definitions of worker also stands at odds with the Court’s insistence that benefits covered by 
Regulation 883/2004 must accord with EU criteria rather than be determined through national 
                                                          
164 Editorial comments ‘The free movement of persons in the European Union: salvaging the dream while 
explaining the nightmare’ (2014) 51 CML Rev 729; O’Brien, ‘The pillory, the precipice and the slippery slope: 
the profound effects of the UK’s legal reform programme targeting EU migrants’ (2015); O’Brien et al, The 
concept of worker under Article 45 TFEU and certain non-standard forms of employment (2015). 
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XXVI FIDE Congress 2014, Vol. 2, para. 2.3; http://fide2014.eu/pdf/FINAL-Topic-2-on-Union-Citizenship.pdf. 
166 Martínez Sala (C-85/96) EU:C:1998:217 at [31]; confirmed in e.g. von Chamier-Glisczinski (C-208/07) 
EU:C:2009:455 at [68]. However, greater alignment with the free movement definition can be seen in recent 
case law e.g. for social policy, Fenoll (C-316/13) EU:C:2015:200. 
167 AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in De Jaeck (C-340/94) EU:C:1996:322 at [22] of the Opinion; see also the judgment 
of the Court at [25]-[33]. 
168 Van der Veen (100/63) EU:C:1964:65, p573. For analysis of Regulation 883/2004 and internal market law, 
see Paju, The European Union and Social Security Law (2017), ch2.  
169 See also, H Verschueren ‘Scenarios for Brexit and social security’ (2017) 24 MJ 367, 371. 
 36 
classification170 (or solely via the Regulation171), which results in definitional convergence for some 
aspects of the social security rules but not others.172  
More remarkably still, the definition of worker applied for art. 45 TFEU has never been 
harmonised by EU legislation. Regulation 492/2011 neither adopts nor references it. The Court’s 
approach to uniform application in Levin is therefore different from case law in which the applicable 
rules are explicitly harmonised.173 Regulation 492/2011 seeks to assist workers who move to navigate 
through different national systems and must guarantee a baseline of equal treatment with host State 
workers. But as noted in the earlier discussion on Reed, it is not then explained how the ‘disparities 
happen’ reasoning should be reconciled with the autonomous concept case law, which aims more to 
invigorate the fiction of a unitary workplace within which the EU worker moves as a special being 
beyond the reach of national criteria applied to identify host State workers.  
 The decision in Geven, linked to the Hartmann/Giersch case law examined above, illustrates 
very well the contradictions highlighted in this discussion. The Court ruled that a ‘sufficiently 
substantial occupation’ requirement applicable only to workers not residing in Germany could be 
imposed on the granting of a child-raising allowance. The applicant lived in the Netherlands but 
worked in Germany between three and 14 hours per week. Noting the ‘wide discretion’ that Member 
States have in the field of social policy, the Court held that Regulation 492/2011 did not preclude 
Germany from excluding ‘a national of another Member State who resides in that State and is in minor 
employment [in Germany] from receiving a social advantage with the characteristics of German child-
raising allowance on the ground that he does not have his permanent or ordinary residence [there]’.174 
The Court did mention Levin in noting the referring court’s conclusion that the applicant was a worker 
for the purposes of Regulation 492/2011.175 But it did not refer to Levin again in its substantive analysis 
or seek in any way to explain its openness to the application of a national employment hours threshold 
here. Not surprisingly, AG Geelhoed had reached the opposite conclusion precisely by applying the 
Levin test i.e. examining whether the applicant’s level of activity was marginal and ancillary.176 He also 
argued that ‘the requirement of minor employment…distinguishes between two categories of frontier 
workers working in Germany (those below and those above the threshold of minor employment), 
                                                          
170 E.g. Jordens-Vosters (69/79) EU:C:1980:7 at [6].  
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even though having regard to the purpose of child-raising benefit to stimulate child-birth in Germany 
those frontier workers are all in the same position, i.e. they do not contribute to that objective’.177  
Different definitions of worker apply in national employment laws for different circumstances 
– eligibility for in-work benefits being just one example – and these could be applied to EU nationals 
in the same circumstances.178 EU legislative reform could ‘make express reference’ to the laws of the 
Member States to determine the concept of worker for the purposes of arts 45-48 TFEU,179 essentially 
extending what applies for social security coordination at present.180 In a sense, the argument sits 
between the judgment and Opinion in Geven: there should be a place for national criteria, since the 
definition of worker has not been harmonised by EU legislation; but these criteria should be subject 
to EU legal parameters – in particular, they must be applied without any distinction on nationality 
grounds.181 Other legal parameters developed or adapted specifically for the free movement of 
workers would still apply: for example, that the motivation of the worker in taking up employment is 
irrelevant.182 Moreover, if the socio-economic dimension of the Charter develops more progressively 
in the future than we have seen to date, another critical layer of EU rights protection could yet 
manifest.183 But without harmonisation of definitions by the EU legislator, it seems unrealistic to 
expect EU law to do more, for now, on the basis that conceiving of a unitary workplace traversing all 
of the Member States as well as their regulatory needs is also, for now, unrealistic. This consequence 
of equal treatment analysis comes with risk. However, not returning equal treatment to the centre of 
free movement reform thinking could yet take us to far more dangerous places. 
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Conclusion  
 
This article has argued, first, that aiming for the greatest possible freedom of movement is a legitimate 
aspiration but that it serves less well as a legally binding benchmark against which to sustain the rights 
of EU workers into the future. We often speak of ‘promoting’ free movement but the Treaty, in Article 
3(2) TEU, asks that it be ‘ensured’. Second, how we change EU law must be taken seriously. Not all 
legal sources have equal legal weight; not all premises of the legal framework can be collapsed 
together or transplanted unaltered across different contexts, especially when this would effect 
fundamental and systemic change. The proposals in the 2016 Decision fashioned a patchwork of legal 
principles to present an apparently reasoned account of amendments agreed to politically. Free 
movement law is not immutable. But it forms a system – a system of parts that are deeply 
interconnected in some respects yet materially different in others. The 2016 Decision challenged not 
one or a few but virtually all parts of that system, and it would have upended equal treatment most 
profoundly had it come into effect.  
A Union-wide definition of worker played a particular part when no general rights to move 
and reside existed. Yet despite the force with which uniform application is endorsed in the case law, 
the discretion that national authorities retain and exercise in reality delivers far from uniform practice 
– practice which has not, moreover, been systematically monitored and challenged by the competent 
EU authorities. Moreover, EU legislation never codified the case law definitions. Sharing guardianship 
of free movement by engaging national definitions of work and worker could relieve some of the 
pressure induced by the ‘problematising’ of free movement without compromising the equal 
treatment of EU workers. It would entail personal scope compromise. In particular, EU worker status 
can provide a critical safety net for those who are vulnerable without host State social assistance that 
supplements economic activity.  
But there are deeper questions here about work and welfare. Ritually invoking freedom of 
movement at the level of an ideal beneath which nationality discrimination is not just tolerated but 
positively entreated in EU legislation does nothing to render workers more secure. If national criteria 
are applied, there can still be a vital role for the EU as the gatekeeper of outer parameter principles 
and as coordinator of policy advancement and innovation until such time as the EU legislature decides 
that approximation is necessary and/or desirable and/or possible. This approach calls for the 
assumption of greater positive ownership of the direction of integration by the Member States. We 
may have to think less about EU institutions as the source of the right answers and more as a means 
to ensuring that the right questions are asked across the States. Sharing leadership also means that 
Member States would rightly share more of the criticism for their choices.  
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Overall, we have to confront more openly the fitness for purpose, the sustainability, and the 
quality of free movement rights. At the same time, attention must be paid to the integrity of EU law 
in the process of law reform. The challenge is to induce re-conception of free movement rights where 
that is demonstrably needed, but not to ignore the principles and structures of the wider EU legal 
system in doing so. Reform must be both legally robust and problem-appropriate. It should not be 
overlooked either that some reforms may well require Treaty change. That is just the way it is.  
Political decisions rightly set the reform agenda, but law constrains politics: at least until such 
time as politics changes the legal constraints. Reform that takes the law further away from how 
workers are treated takes free movement further away from the integrity of the person and thereby 
undermines the credibility of many of the Union’s stated objectives. The 2016 proposals responded 
to a particular driver for legislative reform of free movement rights. But ‘[t]he EU should not need the 
prospect of its own imminent demise in order to concentrate its mind on the inequalities that will kill 
it more slowly’.184 Brexit does not cancel out an underlying discontent that can be seen beyond 
internal UK dramas. But neither should the situation of the UK overly distort our understanding of the 
wider EU environment. Complex questions about the allocation of resources and about how 
connections with another State should manifest in a highly fluid free movement context do need to 
be addressed. But they will not be successfully addressed on the pretence of a singular Union 
workplace where movement takes place on a neatly symmetrical basis. They should not be addressed 
by hyper-ramping of circumstantial evidence and perceptions. And they should not be addressed in 
order to deflect attention from national decisions that have far more to do with public spending 
choices than with EU workers in the first place.185  
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